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INTRODUCTION 
The study of an election is often a difficult task 
but always most interesting. It is made difficult by the fre-
quent intangibility of the influence deciding the individual 
voter. The pollsters, Roper and Gallup, have illustrated the 
difficulties involved in an election and their failure makes 
any further comment unnecessary_ The interest of an elec-
tion, however, can arise from a number of factors. There is 
the appeal of the candidates to the people, their characters 
and personalities, the types of campaigning, the issues in-
volved and the Significance of the outcome. All of these 
elements have been highlighted by the latest presidential race 
between President Harry Truman and Governor Thomas Dewey in 
November, 1948, which would also deserve mention on my part, 
if only for the fact that it was the closest election since 
the one we will treat. The issues of the 1948 election were 
many and varied. The appeal of the candidates was on a dif-
ferent plane for the one man was a farm boy who appealed to 
the Simple, home-loving American, while the other was more re-
strained, dignified, intellectual. The Democratic candidate 
spoke of specific proposals and legislation, while the Re-
i 
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publican candidate, confident of victory, sailed his campaign 
ship upon a sea of platitudes hoping to gain the shores of 
victory upon the wave of tlnational unitylt. 
A complete study of an election would demand a 
thorough consideration of all these elements that I have men-
tioned and even more. However, in this study we would like to 
concentrate upon only one of these elements in the 1916 elec-
tion, namely, the issues involved, especially from the time of 
the conventions to the election. It would entail more time aru 
study than is possible here to treat every issue of this pres-
idential race, and so we will restrict ourselves to those is-
sues seemingly most influential upon the voters, to those that 
received most of the candidates' attention and attracted the 
most publicity. We have tried to sift the issues and classi-
fy them, not arbitrarily, but according to their importance, 
which was indicated by the attention of the candidates, news-
papers, periodicals and by the actual results. We will see 
that some issues weTe not properly evaluated during the cam-
paign but were highly overrated by the attention given them. 
Others appeared shortly before the election and demanded an 
immediate and just acknowledgment by the people. Vfuile this 
paper is not as complete as possible, since it will be more of 
a survey than an analysis of the issues, still it should add 
iii 
some understanding to the terse comments of authors upon the 
outcome of the 1916 election. 
Since we will be looking for elements that decided 
the election in favor of the Democrats, the reader should 
not be surprised that the treatment of the issues and many 
of the quotations are favorable to Wilson. Indeed the issues 
gain that much more importance when they are credited with 
having influenced a number of people to vote for him, for 
we are thus enabled to narrow down Wilson's channels of in-
fluence and conjecture upon what swung the election to him. 
The election of 1916 was not the stunning upset 
that took place in 1948, but it was similar in the fact that 
the man in office stood upon specific legislation and pro-
posals while the challenging candidate was satisfied or 
forced to dwell upon platitudes and criticism. Just as in 
1948 when the appeal of such a course fell short of victory 
for Dewey, so in 1916 the appeal of Hughes in this same man-
ner was not enough to swing the winning votes to his side of 
the ledger. 
In 1916 the critical state of the world made the 
election of extreme importance and yet the outcome was to 
turn upon the votes of a very few states and a comparatively 
small number of people. Indeed the men were so very much 
iiii 
alike, the platforms so similar and the issues so compara-
tively few that the election was one of the closest in the 
history of the United States. Two New York newspapers pro-
claimed Hughes the President only to be forced into a re-
traction in a later edition by more complete returns from 
the polls of the West. The results, therefore, enhance the 
importance of the issues for anyone of them might have been 
the deciding factor in the slight majority of the winner. 
Naturally, it is impossible to determine the issue that de-
cided the vote, but we can hope, at least, to shed some 
light upon the nature and importance of those issues in-
volved from the conventions to the elections. 
CHAPTER I 
THE CONVENTIONS AND PLATFORMS 
In studying the issues, naturally the platforms 
formulated at the conventions will be more important than the 
conventions themselves. However, the conventions take on a 
greater importance when they achieve more than their primary 
purpose of selecting the candidates. Such was the case in 
June, 1916. 
The Democratic party, holding their meeting at St. 
Louis in mid-June, showed the country a solidly united 
organization in nominating their candidate by acclamation 
rather than by the ordinary procedure. As Woodrow Wilson 
had no competitor for the nomination the convention was more 
a ratification than a selection. As one of his biographers 
said: "The Democrats, both the body of the party in the South 
and its fairly certain allies in the Western states, were 
proud of their leader. They had not such a spokesman since 
Andrew Jackson." He also noted that even the party masters 
in New York, Indiana and Illinois who nourished a dislike for 
Wilson because the side-doors of the White House were shut to 
them, agreed to the nomination. Everyone realized that 
1 
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Wilson's record was their biggest asset. l 
The Republican convention, on the other hand, did 
not offer the same picture of unity, but was rather a conven-
tion definitely needed to narrow down the Republican candi-
dates to one acceptable by both the Progressives and the Re-
publicans. The discreet selection of Charles Evans Hughes 
probably achieved the highest degree of unity possible between 
these two parties, although this fact was not immediately evi-
dent to all concerned. While, then, the Republicans were 
achieving this unity the Democrats were displaying it and, in 
so doing, unwittingly gave birth to a vote-winning slogan that 
was to sweep the country during the months of campaigning and 
thus become an influential factor in the election. 
The convention of the Democrats verified in a 
striking way the convictions of President Wilson that the 
people of the country, the mass, wanted peace and not war. 
He was aware of the fact that the pacifists in those pre-war 
days far outnumbered the comparatively few who were listen-
ing to the urgings of a militaristic spirit. It was this 
conviction, of course, that had motivated his determination 
to remain neutral in ~egard to both European and Mexican af-
fairs. As "Current Opinion" pointed out, the dominant purpose 
1 William E. Dodd, Woodrow Wilson and His Work, Doubleday, 
Page & Co., New York, 1920, 182-183.---
3 
of the convention was to vindicate this policy of the Presi-
dent in keeping the United States out of war.2 
It was in the light of the convention's aims that 
the speeches, usually frothy effusions of no merit, gained 
some importance. For the keynote speech, in conforming to 
the purpose of the convention, was soon discovered to be also 
in rhythm with the pulse of the nation, or at least that 
cross-section of the nation represented at the assembly. 
Governor Martin H. Glynn, of New York, who had been selected 
for thE key-note oration, was probably delightfully surprise 
at the enthusiastic reaction of that crowd to his well-
delivered speech. 3 He had decided to stress the note of 
peace and the policy of neutrality so frequently adopted by 
our country in the past. At the outset he stressed the 
general ideas of neutrality, its place in American ideals, 
and proceeded to the proof that Wilson's adherence to 
neutrality was in accordance with the traditional American 
policy. To enforce his arguments he began an enumeration 
of the many instances in American history in which a foreign 
outrage of one sort or another had been adequately met, not 
by war but by diplomacy. Naturally, he was then to point 
2 Current Opinion, Vol. LX, July, 1916, 3. 
3 Official Report Qf the Proceedings of the Democratic 
National Convention (held in St. Louis, Missouri), 14-21. 
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to the similarity in Wilson's achievements. 
Glynn had cited a few examples when he feared that 
perhaps he was too dull and not appealing to the crowd, and 
so remarked, "I don't want to take too much time to enumerate 
them all tt , but then, to his surprise, the crowd shouted back, 
"Go on, go on." When Glynn realized that they really meant 
it, he continued with more confidence and soon had the crowd 
hanging on his every word. After each example, besides add-
ing, ttbut we didn't go to war,tt he also asked the crowd, 
ttDo you want more of them?t1 Receiving the cries of ttYes, 
yes~" he continued. After reciting precedents established by 
Pierce, Van Buren, Jefferson, Adams, Washington, before he 
could say, "But we didn't go to war," the crowd now inter-
posed the question, "What did we do?" with a great unified 
shout. 
The crowd was proving to be an ideal audience, de-
vouring every word. Men were jumping up on their seats and 
waving the American flag. In his treatment of the conven-
tion, Walter Millis quotes a good conjecture on this scene • 
••• What was going on in their minds was 
as easily read as if it had been printed ••• 
Pacifism had been jeered at, made to seem 
in opposition to Americanism, until they 
had come to feel almost apologetic about 
it. Now they were told they had been right 
all the time, that one could be patriotic 
and pacifistic, that it was the historic 
American policy to submit to great 
provocation and historically un-American 
to go to war over it; and they could not 
contain themselves. 4 
5 
The extraordinary enthusiasm of the crowd, however, 
worried the party leaders at least momentarily for it looked 
like a huge pacifist demonstration. Senator John Smith of 
Maryland and McCombs after a brief conference, passed to Glynn 
duripg one of the ovations a scrawled note reading, "but we 
are willing to fight if necessary."5 Glynn assured them, 
"I'll take care of that", which he did in a whole section on 
preparedness, assuring the crowd that "the Democratic party 
advocates and seeks preparedness, but it is preparedness for 
defense and not preparedness for aggression'~6 But Glynn 
reached the heights of convention oratory in another passage 
that commentators on this occasion delight in quoting: 
This po'licy does not satisfy those who 
revel in destruction and find pleasure in 
despair. It may not satisfy the fire-
eater or the swashbuckler. But it does 
satisfy those who worship at the altar of 
the God of peace. It does satisfy the 
mothers of the land, at whose hearth and 
fireside no jingoistic war has placed an 
empty chair. It does satisfy the daughters 
4 Walter Millis, Road to War, 1914-1917, Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1935, 319. _ 
5 Baker, Ray Stannard, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947, Vol. V, 252. 
6 Official Proceedings of Democratic Convention, 29. 
of this land, from whom brag and 
bluster have sent no husband, no sweet-
heart and no brother to the smouldering 
dissolution of the grave. It does sat-
isfy the fathers of this land, and the 
sons of this land, who will fight for 
our flag, and die for our flag, when 
Reason primes the rifle, when Honor 
draws the sword, when Justice breathes 
a blessing on the standards they uphold.? 
6 
Thus Glynn's appeal to the pacifists on the ground that the 
President had not brought this country into war was care-
fully balanced with an appeal to the bellicose that Wilson 
was also ready to fight if necessary. 
Two other speeches drove home these same ideas to 
the crowd. The second day presented Senator Ollie James of 
Kentucky whom the New York Times described as having "the 
face of a prizefighter, the body of an oak, and the voice of 
a pipe organ, and all the tricks of the orator at the tip of 
his tongue. uB The passage of his speech which was re-
pea ted in response to the demands of the crowd likewise 
stressed Wilson's neutrality policy • 
••• Without orphaning a single American 
child, without widowing a single Ameri-
can mother, without firing a single gun, 
without the shedding of a single drop of 
blood, he wrung from the most militant 
spirit that ever brooded above a battle-
field an acknowledgment of American 
rights and an agreement to American 
? Ibid., 26. 
B New York Times, June 16, 1916. 
demands. He truly demonstrated that 
principle is mightier than force, that 
diplomacy hath its victories no less 
renowned than war.9 
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Bryan, the convention's favorite, who spoke that same even-
ing, declared: "I have differed with our President on some 
of the methods employed, but I join with the American people 
in thanking God that we have a President who does not want 
this country plunged into this war. tllO 
The long quotations from these speeches stress the 
unifying element running through them but more important they 
give an indication of how there arose from the convention 
that all-important slogan, "He kept us out of war." The 
exact words seem to have been put into the platform by a per-
son unknown to this day despite the research efforts of Ray 
Stannard Baker. After the endorsement of the President and 
Vice President there followed this statement in the plat-
form: 
••• In particular we commend to the 
American people the splendid diplomatic 
victories of our great President, who 
has preserved the vital interests of 
our Government and its citizens, and 
kept us out of war. ll 
9 Democratic Convention, 88-89_ 
10 Ibid., 98-99. 
11 I bid., 130. 
Newton Baker, who probably knew more of the origin of the 
platform than any other- delegate, wrote to R. S. Baker: 
8 
"The phrase 'He kept us out of war' was put in by the Resolu-
tions Committee, by which member I do not know. I myself 
always regarded it as a product of the Glynn speech."12 Be 
that as it may, the Democrats had an effective slogan for the 
coming campaign and a remarkable unity that was made evident 
by the vote of acclamation given to Wilson, 1092 to 1. 
A discussion of the Republican nomination really 
demands the story of two conventions for it was with a defin-
ite purpose that both the Republican and Progressive parties 
called their respective conventions for the same day in June 
in Chicago. Some sort of reconciliation between these two 
parties was obviously in order since the power of the Progress 
ives was on the wane,13 and a refusal to reunite would only 
result in the election of the Democratic candidate. This had 
been the case in 1912 when Roosevelt, bolting the Republican 
party, split their vote and took with him as a Progressive 
candidate 4,126,020 votes in comparison with the Republican 
Taft's 3,483,922 votes. Thus Wilson was elected with 
12 Baker, 257 (footnote). 
13 Frederic Paxson, Pre-War Years, 1913-1917, Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1936, 32b. 
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1,300,000 votes less than the combined total of Taft and 
Rooseve1t. 14 Nevertheless, it was not too evident from the 
opening speeches of both conventions that a combination of 
the parties was possible. 
The key-note speech at the Republican convention 
was given by handsomeWarren Gamaliel Harding who, William 
Allen White claimed, was "bitter, scalding bitter to Theo-
dore Roosevelt," despite a plea that both parties forget 
their differences, 15 while at the Progressive convention 
Raymond Robins made a rabble-rousing key-note speech and had 
become the "idol of the men who had determined to nominate 
Roosevelt.lt16 In the Republican convention it was definite 
that the Taft men would simply not permit the nomination of 
Roosevelt, while the Progressives would not consider Root, 
Lodge or Hughes. This apparent deadlock prevailed right up 
to the end of the two conventions. 
According to White, who covered the conventions for 
the newspapers and was on the inside of the maneuverings in 
the Progressive party, Perkins, the head of the Progressive 
Party, t1was trying to maneuver the Rooseveltians into accept-
14 Samuel E. Morrison & H. S. Commager, The Growth of the 
American Republic, Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1942, 
Vol. II, Statistical Tables in Appendix, 742. 
15 William A. White, The Autobiogra~hY of William Allen White, 
Macmillan Company, New York, 194 , 522. 
16 Ibid., 523. 
10 
ing Hughes as a fusion nominee."l? At the same time, how-
ever, there was a group of Progressives striving to bring 
about the nomination of Roosevelt before the Republican 
nominee could be offered to the convention. The latter fac-
tion, of which White was a member, won and Roosevelt was 
nominated just before noon on the last day amidst a great fan-
fare despite the efforts of Perkins to control the floor. 
Shortly after, at the Republican convention Hughes received 
the nomination of the Republican party. 
Thus, the desire of the Progressives to have their 
standard bearer accepted by the Republicans was not to be at-
tained even tho the mention of Roosevelt's name as a nominee 
at the Republican convention had evoked a rousing round of 
applause and a demonstration that continued for forty minutes. 
But when two ballots were cast before adjourning on Friday 
evening Hughes led the field while Roosevelt commanded the 
noise. The Republicans' stampede to Hughes at Saturday noon 
ended all uncertainty, and Hughes himself left them with no 
doubts as to his intentions or his capacity for action, for he 
immediately sent his resignation to the President announcing 
his retirement from the Supreme Court. 
17 Ibid., 523. 
r 11 
The Progressives, moreover, were to be disappointed 
a second time. They had not made sure of Roosevelt's accept-
ance if nominated. Although the Colonel had given a con-
ditional refusal before the convention, still he had not 
publicly foresworn the Progressive Party since he was hoping 
for a nomination by the combination of the two parties. How-
ever, those who were close to Roosevelt were of the opinion 
that he would never again lead a third party. "Americans 
are a two-party people, there is no place for a third party 
in our politics" were his words to a friend. 18 It was the 
knowledge that such a candidacy was doomed to failure, plus 
his passion for a defeat of Wilson, that finally made 
Roosevelt turn down the Progressive candidacy. Accordingly, 
he sent word to the convention that he would not run and then 
proceeded to name as alternate candidate nenry Cabot Lodge, 
"perhaps the one man whose long record of bourbon conserva-
tisrn offered the greatest denial of every liberal tenet to 
which the party had been dedicated,".19 Secretary of Agricul-
ture Houston,present at the moment of the announcement, said, 
itA more stunned, whipped crowd, I had never looked upon. It 
was a pitiful spectacle. It had been hoaxed.,,20 
18 Paxson, £R.cit., 334. 
19 Millis, £R.cit., 317. 
White 
20 David F. Houston, Eight Years ~ Wilson's Cabinet,Double-
day, Page & Company, New York, Vol. I. 
12 
records, that he saw "hundreds of men tear the Roosevelt pic-
ture or the Roosevelt badge from their coats, and throw it 
on the floor.,,21 Another spectator, Ida Tarbell, also re-
corded the resentment evident at that moment: "It was a 
great and noble-hearted body, and its tremendous fight de-
served a better end than the cowardly stab that its leader 
gave it in the message which its chairman mercifully and 
wisely withheld until almost the moment of adjournment. tt22 
All these remarks are significant in the light of the later 
defection of the Progressives from the Republican party. 
Since the Progressives were not only without a 
nominee but also a man who could command enough votes to make 
it worthwhile to run as their candidate, there was nothing 
left to do but endorse the Republican candidate. It is 
significant, however, that when the National Committee did 
meet again on June 26 to vote, the endorsement was divided 
with 32 for, 6 against Hughes, and 9 silent. 23 
Nevertheless, the choice of Charles Evans Hughes 
was perhaps the best one possible. Even Joseph Tumulty, 
Wilson's secretary, admitted that after Hughes' nomination 
21 White, 527 
22 Ida Tarbell, quoted in American Year Book, 1916, 30. 
23 Paxson, 345. 
13 
"there was deep depression in the ranks of our party through-
out the country, the opinion being that the former Supreme 
Court Justice was an invincible foe. tt24 The greatest factor 
in his favor seemed to be the fact that he had no part in the 
schism of 1912. In his lofty position in the Supreme Court 
he had been above the "dust and clamor of partisan feuds" and 
had maintained silence. White thought it the best possible 
nomination because most of Roosevelt's friends preferred 
Hughes to Taft as did also the followers of LaFollette. 25 
Roosevelt himself "supported Hughes largely because he 
bitterly disliked Wilson in all his works and ways~26 
The appeal of Hughes to the people was evident. He 
had been a great reform governor of New York, and his honest 
and able exposure of the venal and c~iminal actions of big 
business, the great insurance companies, and the machine 
elements of both the Democratic and the Republican parties, 
gave promise of a good national government. 27 His service 
with the Supreme Court doubtlessly added great distinction 
to the Republican's cause. Of great help, too, was his 
silence upon all phases of the war, including the Lusitania 
incident and the submarine warfare. 
24 Joseph Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As 1 Know Him, Garden City 
Publishing Company, New York, 1927, 191. 
25 Qn.cit., 528. 
26 Ibid., 528. 
27 Dodd, 185. 
r 
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Another thing about Hughes, mentioned mostly by 
the followers of Wilson, was his very close resemblance to 
the President, which, Baker claims, was Hughes' peculiar 
availability from the beginning. 28 Roosevelt himself later 
dubbed Hughes ria whiskered Wilson" while a newspaperman was 
asking as early as the April before the convention: "What is 
the purpose of nominating Justice Hughes? To continue the 
Wilson administration under Republican auspices? tl29 This 
point is of some importance, at least to my mind, for it 
seems to throw a little light on the extreme closeness of 
this presidential race. There seems to be no doubt that the 
Republicans did not want to differ with Wilson upon the most 
vital issue of the day, namely, entanglement in war on either 
side of the belligerents. If this issue was going to be met 
head on, then Roosevelt or Wood would have been chosen for 
the whole country knew that those men stood for immediate 
and extensive military and naval preparation and for prompt 
military action. But the Republican leaders knew the tem.per 
of the country as well as the Democrats and they knew that 
the people did not want war. Hence we have in the champion 
28 Baker, 247. 
29 Frank I. Cobb, .lliU! York World, April 2, 1916. 
-15 
and the challenger two candidates very similar to one another 
in character, background and ideals. This similarity will 
now move over into the issues of the campaign and thus help 
to provide a close battle dovm the stretch to the election. 
There was such a marked likeness between the two 
platforms that the Socialists in their Hand Book for the cam-
paign printed the two platforms with an issue-by-issue con-
trast under the heading, tlVihere I s the Issue?,,30 There was a 
great deal of truth behind this question for the points of 
agreement were numerous. The position of each party on 
women's suffrage was one instance. Both platforms likewise 
demanded stric't enforcement of the civil service laws, a 
simple and business-like budget system for the government, 
a rigid economy in national expenditure, the encouragement 
of business, and the strict supervision and regulation of 
monopoly. The Republicans requested an "effective system 
of rural credits" while the Democrats boasted, "we passed 
the rural credits act." The two parties called for a tariff 
commission for impartial study of that problem, and for the 
careful conservation of natural resources; and while the 
Republicans favored the extension of a rural mail delivery 
system, again the Democrats could boast that they had added 
10,000 delivery routes. 31 
30 Socialist Hand ~, The Socialist Party, Chicago, 1916,30 
31 Ibid., 30. 
16 
Upon the smaller points of foreign policy such as 
closer, more friendly relations with the Pan-American Re-
publics and approval of the Monroe Doctrine, they were in 
perfect agreement. Moreover, although the platforms dis-
agreed in their attitude toward the Philippines with the Re-
publicans being more inclined to grant independence sooner 
than the Democrats, still there was little discussion of this 
issue during the campaign. 32 
With regard to the attitude of the parties upon the 
threatening war, it was clear that both favored adequate pre-
paredness, an adequate army and navy for defense, an adequate 
merchant marine, the protection of American citizens in all 
his rights at home and abroad, by land and sea, and the main-
tenance of a strict and honest neutrality. Obviously, there 
was no clash here in aims or ideals, but the Republicans 
nevertheless made a major issue out of Wilson's handling of 
these policies, expressing more disapproval of this procedure 
than of his purpose. This same approach was taken on Wilson's 
Mexican policy. Another point upon which the platforms 
agreed in ideal but not in fact was the civil service reform. 
While both parties advocated it, the Republicans claimed that 
the Wilsonian administration had been chock-full of partisan-
ship appointments. The tariff, however, was a subject of 
32 Ibid., 30. 
17 
definite disagreement as was also the matter of progressive 
legislation. The Democrats were not only able to appeal in 
their platform to Wilson's record but on the strength of his 
record they were able also to predict more social and 
economic reforms, whereas the Republicans in the role of 
challengers naturally had no record nor did they advocate as 
many new reforms as the Democrats. 33 
In treating all of these issues I should like to 
consider the tariff, cIvil service, and the Mexican policy as 
a unit because in spite of the fact that the Republicans laid 
great stress upon these issues, the strategy involved 
terminated in failure. On the other hand the other two is-
sues of the parties, their respective attitudes to the 
threatening war and appeals to the Progressives, take on the 
greatest importance because they were considered by the news-
papers and independent authors to be the predominant and de-
ciding factors in the victory of the Democrats. They will re 
ceive more attention. However, with regard to the first 
three issues we must at least give the respective stands of 
the parties and the candidates. But before we consider any 
of them, we must turn our attention to a peculiar phenomenon 
in the 1916 election worthy of our consideration, a phenomeno 
that I have termed, the "artificial issues." 
33 Ibid., 30. 
CHAPTER II 
ARTIFICIAL ISSUES 
In many presidential campaigns, there appear issues 
that gain undeserved publicity and attention. For a time 
these issues dominate all others in the newspapers only to 
lose their appeal before the election, or at least, fail to 
have any noticeable effect upon the voting. That is why I 
would refer to such issues as "artificial", for though there 
might even be a divergence of opinion upon the subject in-
volved, still because their importance is so very much over-
rated they do not deserve a place with the real major issues 
of the campaign. There were two such issues in the 1916 cam-
paign and their prominence in the thought of all demands ac-
knowledgment in a study of this election. The newspapers 
pounced upon these issues, the persons affected protested 
their value to the candidates, and for a time they seemed to 
be of major importance. However, when the showdown arrived 
at the time of the election they disappeared into the ranks 
of the insignificant. 
One of the issues that followed this pattern faith-
fully was the so-called "hyphenate" issue which received at-
tention even before the conventions met because of President 
Wilson's outspokenness on the subject. As early as November 
18 
19 
4, 1915, in an address given at the Manhattan Club in New 
York, he expressed his grave concern over the voices being 
raised in America "which came from men who loved other 
countries better than they loved America, men who were parti-
sans of other causes than that of America." lie claimed 
that they had forgotten that their chief and only allegiance 
was to the great government under which they live. l Of much 
more importance than this speech was his annual message to 
Congress in Joint Session on December 7, a little over a 
month later, when he again struck at the un-American spirit 
of certain quarters of the country: 
There are citizens of the U.S., I 
blush to admit, born under other flags 
but welcomed under our generous naturali-
zation laws to the full freedom and op-
portunity of America, who have poured 
the poison of disloyalty into the very 
arteries of our national life ••• (who) 
seek to make this proud country once 
more a hotbed of European passion. 2 
Though this topic was referred to as the "hyphen-
ate" question before this time, Wilson helped to perpetuate 
the term when he again attacked this overzealous partisanship 
in a speech in honor of John Barry, Father of the American 
Navy. Wilson's attacks were still general, not stating the 
1 Albert Shaw, President Wilson's State Papers ~ Addresses, 
George H. Doran Company, New York, 1917, 132. 
2 Ibid., 150. 
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particular hyphenates involved such as the Germans, English 
or Irish. But in this particular speech the allusion was 
rather obvious since Wilson was angered at the anti-English 
opposition to the repeal of the tolls-exemption clause, then 
pending. 
Some Americans need hyphens in thiir 
names, because only part of them have 
come over. But when the whole man has 
come over, heart and thought and all, 
the hyphen drops of its own weight out 
of his name. j 
These were not the only references made to the 
hyphenate issue during the months before the conventions but 
they are enough to indicate that the problem had a prominent 
place in Wilson's thoughts. During this time, however, some 
German-Americans had formed an alliance, met at a convention 
in Chicago, and were now threatening to wield their influ-
ence at the polls of the next election. Greatly angered at 
this attempt at intimidation, President Wilson spoke harsh-
ly against the hyphenates in the Flag Day Address at Washing-
ton on June 14, the very day that the Democratic convention 
opened in st. Louis. He referred to active disloyalty in 
the country and how it should be crushed even if it proceeded 
from a very active and subtle minority. Then he attacked its 
3 Ray S. Baker and W. E. Dodd, The Public Papers of Woodrow 
Wilson, Harpers & Brothers, New York, 1926, III, 109. 
method of operating: 
It works underground, but it shows 
its ugly head where we can see it; and 
there are those at this moment who are 
trying to levy a species of blackmail, 
saying IDo what we wish in the interest 
of foreign sentiment or we will wreak 
our vengeance at the polls,.4 
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Thus we see that the issue was connected with the vote, and 
that Wilson has taken a firm stand. 
The Democratic newspapers, especially the New York 
World, were also accusing the German-American Alliance of 
organizing to control the vote.5 Articles appeared in 
independent magazines such as the Atlantic Monthly, Outlook 
and the Living Age attacking those Germans who were only 
geographically and politically American. That this offen-
sive was sustained as well as critical can be ascertained 
from the fact that as early as October 1915 the Literary 
Digest had written an article which characterized the 
attacks as a "Swat-the-Hyphen" movement. 6 As the three 
parties approached their respective conventions, there 
was some speculation as to just how each party would ap-
proach this problem now that it had forced itself upon the 
attention of potential voters throughout the country, for, 
4 ~ York Times, June 15, 1916. 
5 ~ York World, March 19, 1916, was an example. 
6 Literary Digest, October 15, 1915, 943-944. 
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indeed, the problem seemed to involve not only the votes of 
the hyphenates themselves but others also because of the 
prevailing strong sentiment for and against these German-
American people. 
Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, as usual, left the 
German-Americans and his Progressive Party in little doubt 
as to his stand. His violent attacks upon the hyphenates 
had made newspaper columns time and time again. Although 
he must have realized there were other factors precluding 
his nomination, nevertheless considerable importance was 
attached by the Colonel to this one. On November 27, 1915 
in a letter to his friend Lodge, he had observed that "the 
German-Americans of every kind, and whole flapdoodle paci-
fist and mollycoddle outfit" would be against him~"7 And 
even more to the point on December 7 he wrote: liAs you 
know, I feel that the course I have followed about the 
hyphenated Americanism, and especially the German-American 
vote, is such as absolutely to preclude the possibility of 
nominating me as a candidate. u8 
The passage of time only served to heighten the 
anger of Mr. Roosevelt for after a conference of the German-
American Alliance on May 28 and 29 his attacks became more 
7 Hermann Hagedorn, Correspondence of Roosevelt ~ Lodge, 
Charles Scribner and Sons, New York, 1925, II, 464. 
8 Ibid., ~66-467; see 479 for another letter expressing the 
same 0 inion. 
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furious. He gave a speech at the very day after the close 
of the meeting. The editor of the World, who was pro-
Democratic and hence rarely impressed by anything that Roose-
velt said, styled his talk as "hitting straight from the 
shoulder," for Roosevelt denounced the Alliance as an "anti-
American alliance,tI and its activities as "moral treason" to 
the republic.,,9 Doubtless, another good reason for Roose-
velt's anger was the tenor of the resolutions adopted by the 
German-American Newspapers Publishers Association during that 
meeting. While the meeting named no names in the resolu-
tions adopted on May 29, "it hardly concealed behind its 
descriptions of the requirements for a candidate who might de-
serve the united German-American vote ••• the negation of 
both Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt." lO Moreover, when 
on June 5 the German-American Alliance sent protests to the 
Progressive Party Committee against the possible nomination 
of Roosevelt and Root, Roosevelt returned t·o the attack with 
a message to the same committee on June 22 that was stinging 
in bitterness: 
No good American whatever his ancestry 
or creed can have any feeling except scorn 
and detestation for those professional 
German-Americans who seek to make the 
American President in effect a viceroy of 
9 New York World, June 1, 1916. 
10 Paxson, 339. 
the German Emperor. The Professional 
German-Americans of this type are act-
ing purely in the sinister interest of 
Germany.ll 
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Without a doubt this attitude of Roosevelt on the hyphenate 
question had an influence upon the Republican Committee, al-
though it was probably the least of their reasons for refus-
ing to nominate him. Nevertheless, the issue loomed l~gein 
those early days of June, and the Republican candidate was to 
be one who had not alienated all of these German-American 
votes. 
The silence of Charles Evans Hughes on this, as well 
as on other political matters, made him even more acceptable 
to the Republican Committee but especially did it raise the 
hopes of the German-American Newspapers and his nomination 
was greeted with great outbursts of enthusiasm. Typical of 
these newspapers was the reaction of a Milwaukee paper which, 
upon news of his nomination, plastered a picture of him and 
Mrs. Hughes on the front page and expressed their hope and 
confidence with the words beneath the picture: "the next pres-
ident and his wife."12 Hope even traveled across the seas 
to Germany where the Cologne paper, the Kolnische Zeitung, 
reputed for generations to be the mouthpiece of the .. erman 
Foreign Office policy, seemed to look with a favorable eye 
11 American Year Book, 1916, 33. 
12 Milwaukee-Sonntagspost, June 11, 1916. 
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upon the Hughes candidacy. It expressed its delight that 
Roosevelt's ttchauvinistic anti-Germanism lf had been definitely 
repudiated by the Republican party.13 This same paper did 
not entertain any very good opinion of Wilson for in the same 
issue it said "that German-Americans, on whose vote perhaps 
the decision of the election rests are for the most part pub-
licly on the side of Hughes," and pointed to their "opportuni-
ty of paying back President Wilson for his false, hypocriti-
cal neutrality and for his unheard of attacks on this Ameri-
can nationality.,,14 
The Republicans, therefore, did not pass up the 
opportunity offered them but made tla determined effort to woo 
the pro-German element.,,15 Accordingly at the Republican 
convention Chairman Warren G. Harding dealt with the issue 
in a rather soothing manner in his opening address on June 7: 
One must be human; to be an American 
he must have sympathies and human loves; 
and I should pity the foreign-born sons of 
foreign-born parents whose very souls are 
not wrung £~ the catacylsmal sorrow of the 
old world. 
The Republican platform was likewise mild in its approach to 
13 ~iterary Digest, 53:1, July 1, 1916. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Thomas A. Bailey, Diplomatic history of the American 
People, F. S. Crofts & Co., 1946, 638-9. 
16 Republican Campaign Text Book, Republican National Com-
mittee, 1916, 28. 
26 
the subject: "We appeal to all Americans, whether naturalized 
or native born, to prove to the world that we are Americans i 
thought and in deed, with only one loyalty, one hope and one 
aspiration." It then called upon "all Americans to be true 
to the spirit of America, to the great traditions of their 
common country. l1l7 
This Republican strategy seemed to demand that 
Hughes should try to straddle the pro-German issue. The 
theme of his nomination speech was "America first and America 
efficient.tt When he said that he was "for the firm and un-
flinching maintenance of all the rights of American citizens 
on land and seat! the Germans took that to mean that he would 
enforce American commercial rights as against the British 
blockade. 18 This use of vague phrases by Hughes led "to his 
being renamed Charles 'Evasive' Hughes, and to the quip that 
he had left the bench for the fence. tt19 
There was no "pussyfooting" on the issue by the 
Democrats. We have already seen how Wilson, even before the 
conventions met, had attacked the hyphenates. For a brief 
moment, however, there was a tendency among members of the 
17 Official Report of the Proceedings Q£ the Republican 
National Convention, 164. 
18 The New Republic, July 9, 1919. 
19 Bailey, quoted by, 639. 
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party at the Democratic convention to straddle the issue 
and side-track forceful language against it. When Tumulty 
was informed by one of the editors of the Milwaukee Journal 
that this spirit was prevalent among party members, he 
realized that the adoption of this attitude in the plat-
form would result in bitter disappointment to the country, 
and so he immediately wrote to Wilson that the hyphen issue 
should be met in a "manly, aggressive and militant fashion.u~) 
At once Wilson warned Secretary Baker, his representative 
at the convention, to insist upon a Itdefinite and unequivocal 
repudiation of the hyphen vote."21 The Presidentrs tele-
gram to Baker resulted in the insertion of a paragraph in 
the platform that condemned in strong language all hyphenate 
activity in behalf of a foreign power.22 Wilson never 
stopped in this drive against the hyphenates but perhaps 
his best declaration of independence of this element was 
in his acceptance speech from Shadow Lawn, New Jersey, his 
summer headquarters - "I neither seek the favor nor fear 
the displeasure of that small alien element which puts 
loyalty to any foreign power before loyalty to the United 
States. 23 
20 Tumulty, 188-190. 
21 Ibid., 190. 
22 Democratic Convention~ 122. 
23 Baker and Dodd, II, 2~2-283. 
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As usual the newspapers lined up on both sides 
and for a while hyphenism was one of the two planks of the 
Democratic party upon which the "fire of the opposition 
seemed to center ••• tt24 Republican newspapers and the 
German-American papers like the Germania-Herold of Milwaukee 
claimed that the Democratic stand was "an attack upon a 
whole nationality," the Free Press of Lincoln, Nebraska 
stated that it was "an insult to all Americans of German 
blood" while the New Yorker Staats Zeitung echoed more or 
less the same sentiments. 25 However, a few reputedly 
Republican papers like the Des MoinesCapitol admired the 
stand of the President and commended its opponents for 
being uplainer and bolder in this declaration of Americanism" 
than the Republican platform; and the New York Press af£irmed 
that the "hyphenates have more to hope for from Wilson than 
from Hughes. ,,26 
Wilson's Democratic colleagues hoped that press 
comments like the following would have a sobering effect on 
anyone who intended to cast his vote for Hughes: 
If Hughes should be elected President 
his success would be regarded throughout 
24 "The Democrats and the Issues," Literary Digest, 53:1, 
July 1, 1916. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
the world as a tremendous victory for 
Germany in the U.S. It would be a 
notice to all civilization that the 
German vote, and through the German 
vote the German Government, holds the 
balance of povler in American politics. 27 
29 
Editorials such as "We Fight Mit Hughes," and "German Drive 
Against Wilson," might have made the German-American es-
pousal of Hughes a burden rather than a help. Ambassador 
Gerard was probably right \"hen he said that for Wilson it 
soon became "an asset to have the German-American against 
him. ,,28 
But Hughes had more to contend with than the 
Democratic newspapers. There was his bellicose associate, 
Teddy Roosevelt, whose ranting speeches probably alienated 
many pro-German and peace-loving Republicans. There were 
some who thought that Roosevelt's speeches did much to 
embarass Hughes. For instance, in a letter to President 
Wilson Colonel House claimed that he had been informed by 
newspapermen that "Hughes vIas becoming more irritable and 
that it is caused largely by Roosevelt's speeches."29 In 
his book Mr. Paxson points out that Itin this particular 
aspect of the canvas, the support of Roosevelt was a lia-
bility to Hughes, for Roosevelt would make no concession to 
27 New York World, June 13 1916. 
28 Charles Seymour! ~ Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 
Boston, 1928, II, 23. 
29 Ibid., II, 371. 
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prudence." Roosevelt, he adds, spoke in contempt of what 
he thought was hedging on the part of Hughes, and he was 
growing in dislike of Hughes because of the latter's care-
fully balanced utterances. "To his newspaper friends 
Roosevelt criticized the inept technique with which Hughes, 
instead of profiting by counsel, just 'withdraws into his 
whiskers;' when he exploded to them about the 'bearded lady' 
it was Hughes he had in mind. u30 
Fortunately for Hughes, the German-Americans were 
not alienated by Roosevelt from their support of the repub-
lican side. This was made evident after Roosevelt's attack 
of the hyphenates in Lewiston, Maine when, despite a tele-
gram from Hughes congratulating Roosevelt upon the speech, 
the German-American newspapers hastened to give assurances 
that they didn't care what Roosevelt said since Hughes was 
the candidate. 31 However, the President did gain a tactical 
advantage over Hughes in his treatment of the O'Leary case.32 
Jeremiah A. O'Leary was a member of the American Truth 
Society and apparently patronized by the German Embassy. He 
was engaged in dislodging the Irish and German votes from 
the Democratic ticket, and so with his associates pushed 
30 Paxson, 350. 
31 Literary Digest, 53:12, Sept. 16, 1916. 
32 Paxson, 350. 
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the charge that 1;lilson was more harsh in his dealings with 
Germany than with England, and that his neutrality was a 
fraud. In a long telegram to the President, in September 
he denounced Wilson's insincerity and warned him of political 
consequences. In this telegram he also mentioned lililson' s 
"truckling to the British Empire" and his "dictatorship over 
Congress." Seizing this opportunity afforded him by O'Leary, 
Wilson, before a group of nevlspapermen, replied with a brief, 
pointed answer that was quoted everywhere: 
I would feel deeply mortified to 
have you or anybody like you vote 
for me. Since you have access to 
many disloyal Americans, and I have 
not, I will ask you to convey this 
message to them.33 
Tumulty regarded this decisive act by the President as 
somewhat of a turning point in the campaign for at that 
time the Democrats '",ere rather depressed due to the Maine 
elections which indicated a victory for the Republicans in 
the coming election. He also felt that it won the hearty 
and unanimous approval of the country for the president.34 
Robert Lansing, in his \,var Memoirs, thought that this "made 
thousands of votes for its author."35 While Colonel House 
33 Tumulty, 214. 
34 Ibid. 214-215. 
35 RObert Lansing, War Memoirs, Scribner & Sons, N.Y., 1935, 
162-163. 
,. 
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told the President that the telegram -,{as lithe best thing so 
far in the campaign. 1I 36 A lone dissenter to all these 
favorable opinions was Walter Millis who thought that it 
probably cost the President New York where the Irish Tammany 
votes dominated the Democratic party.37 
Perhaps Hughes sensed the political significance 
of Wilson's outspoken defiance of the hyphenates for he 
himself hastened to add on October 24: "I don I t want the 
support of anyone to whom the interests of this nation are 
not supreme. 1I38 The New York Times probably expressed the 
general reaction of the people to this statement when it 
co~mented: "He speaks too late and makes the fatal mistake 
of saying in a weaker way what his opponent and men of 
sturdier courage in his own party long ago said with full 
sincerity and sledge-hammer emphasis. 1I39 
Thus was the hyphenate problem treated by the 
principal persons and parties involved in the election of 
1916. It is evident from the \,-lords of the candidates and 
the comments of the newspapers and magazines that this was 
considered a vital issue. But despite all the hullabaloo 
the German-American question as a vital election issue 
36 House, I, 365. 
37 Millis, 347. 
38 ~ ~ Times, October 25, 1916. 
39 ~., October 26, 1916. 
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proved a colossal flop. The German vote proved to be largely 
a myth, and where not a myth a minor factor. Just a short 
while after the returns were counted the New York Times 
voiced the opinion that prevailed generally in the other 
newspapers and in the magazines: 
A survey of the returns by states 
fails to disclose where the hyphenate 
vote threw a single electoral vote to 
Hughes. Either there was no hyphen 
vote or it was cancelled or more than 
cancelled in ~ts own territory by anti-
hyphen votes.40 
Two of the largest cities in the country with a 
predominant German-American population were St. Louis and 
Milwaukee and yet both were carried by Wilson. In the little 
city of Hoboken where propaganda for the German-American 
was used quite intensively during the campaign Wilson beat 
Hughes by a count of 5,167 to 4,201. In Wisconsin, Maryland, 
and Missouri the German-American vote might have been a 
major factor but that is not too evident. However, in 
Cincinnati where German-Americans constituted one-third 
of the people, there was a majority of 12,000 for Hughes in 
Hamilton County of which Cincinnati is a part. Yet even 
this was in vain for the state of Ohio went to Wilson. 
Where their votes might have produced results in accord 
40 Ibid., November 12, 1916. 
-with their boasts was in Minnesota or Oregon but again the 
evidence was not sufficient to verify the claim. 
"The Disappearance of the Hyphen ll , a post-elec-
tion editorial appearing in Fair Play, a German-American 
weekly, carries in its title more or less the whole story 
of this election issue. Why it disappeared is a question 
beyond our present inquiry. It is sufficient for us to 
note that the issue had a short-lived and illusory importance 
in the campaign, but in the payoff of the election proved 
to have had little or no ,value to the Republican candidate. 
Another "artificial" issue that received just a 
bit less publicity and attention was that of woman's suf-
frage. The origin of suffragette parties in the various 
states and their progress in gaining the right to vote need 
not detain us. It is sufficient to note that the suffra-
gettes were not discouraged by the failure of their amend-
ment for universal suffrage in the previous election, but 
were preparing to keep in the public eye in the coming 
campaign of 1916. They arranged a demonstration along with 
a convention to be held in Chicago. It met just two days 
before the Republican convention when they also staged a 
parade along Michigan Avenue supposedly to impress the 
Republicans with their strength. At the convention a 
National Women's Party was launched. 
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Hm"ever, the demonstration of their "power" and 
enthusiasm seemedto have no noticeable effect upon the 
platform of either party; the two were practically identical. 
The Republican platform favored "the extension of the suf-
frage to women, but recognized the right of each state to 
settle the question for itself;" while the Democratic plat-
form differed little with its advocation of the "extension 
of the franchise of the women of the country by the states;t41 
It must be noted, h01.vever, that it was upon this question 
that the Democratic convention had its most lively debate, 
the discussion taking up almost sixteen pages in the pub-
lished proceedings. 42 There were present "large numbers 
of representatives of women's organizations, bedecked with 
bright yellow sashes, ribbons and parasols, (who) filled 
the galleries, vociferously demanding a sweeping declara-
tion of the approval of their plank" which called for 
universal women's suffrage by amendment to the federal 
constitution and not by the state-by-state process.43 
However, when the substitute plank favored by the women 
was put to a vote, it was defeated by a one-sided vote of 
888 1/2 to 181 1/2, and the Wilson plank was adopted as 
above stated.44 
41 Republican Convention, 168; Democratic Convention, 130. 
42 Ibid., 131-147. 
43 Baker, 261. 
4~ Democratic Convention 147. 
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It was evident what the reaction of the women's 
organizations would be to both platforms. "Suffrage Planks 
Not Enough", the title of an article in the Literary Digest 
shortly after the conventions, expressed exactly the 
sentiments of the militant suffragettes.45 Perpahs their 
protests had something to do with the subsequent change of 
Mr. Hughes. At any rate, the Digest was able to write a 
new column on the suffrage 'with this heading: tlMr. Hughes 
New Suffrage Plank" for, in the words of a newspaper quoted 
in the article, :Hr. Hughes had "stolen a march on President 
Wilson and delivered a telling blow against him in many 
states," by coming out for the Susan B. Anthony consti-
tutional amendment providing for woman suffrage.46 It is 
well to note that this statement attributed some power to 
the suffragettes for it was a common opinion at this time. 
Hughes had made no mention of the amendment in 
his acceptance speech but on the very next day he had sent 
a telegram in answer to an inquiry of Senator Sutherland of 
Utah, which was quoted by the papers as follows: 
In my answer to the notifi'cation, I 
did not refer to the proposed Federal 
amendment relating to the woman suffrage 
45 Literary Digest,' 53:1, July 1, 1916. 
46 Ibid., 53:7, August 12, 1916. 
as this was not mentioned in the plat-
form ••• My view is that the proposed 
amendment should be submitted and 
ratified, and the subject removed from 
political discussion.~7 
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Later that same day in a speech in New York before a Woman's 
League, he gave as his reasons for favoring the equal suf-
frage amendment the bitterness of this long continued 
struggle of the women and the fact that such agitation 
would only obscure the normal issues.48 Whether these 
reasons were sufficient or not, President Wilson, when 
called upon by ~~s. Carrie Chapman Catt, president of the 
Women's Suffrage Association,to do the same, simply refused, 
and in a letter to Mrs. E. P. Davis on August 5, he made 
this observation: 
47 Ibid. 
••• if I should change my personal at-
titude now, I should seem to the country 
like nothing else than an angler for 
votes, because ••• my attitude in this 
matter has again and again been frankly 
avowed ••• 
I have all along believed, and 
still believe t that the thing can best 
and most solidly be done by the action 
of the individual states, and that the 
time it will take to get it that way 
will not be longer than the t~me it will 
take to get it the other way.49 
48 David F. Houston, Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet, 
1913-1920, Doubleday~ Page and Co., New York, 1926, I, a4. 
49 Baker, 277 (footnote). 
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As Baker adds, the President throughout the campaign "adhered 
with good-humored flexibility to the position he had always 
held.,,50 
The threats and cajolings of the women's organ-
izations were numerous and varied during the campaign. They 
boasted frequently of their power at the polls and predicted 
a landslide of votes for Hughes by protesting women. An 
example of this "Ivas the National Women's Party convening 
at Colorado Springs, Colorado, on August 11, pledging itself 
to work in the twelve equal suffrage states to defeat the 
Democratic candidate for President. 
But alas! it was the same story as the hyphenate 
issue, a great deal of shouting and threat-throwing with no 
apparent effect. Of the twelve suffrage states only two, 
Illinois and Oregon, voted for Mr. Hughes, while all of the 
others, including Arizona, Colorado,California, Idaho, 
Kansas, Montana, Nevada, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, voted 
for the reelection of Wilson. In Chicago, the city of the 
Womanis Party convention, there was no sort of proof of the 
assertion that the women supported Mr. Hughes because he 
favored a suffrage amendment to the Constitution. The 
women of Cook County which includes Chicago, gave Hughes 
50 Baker, 277 (footnote). 
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about 135,000 votes and Mr. Wilson 130,000. Since Illinois 
wisely tabulated the votes of women separately from those 
of men, the results pOinted out that "in political psycho-
logy, the feminine mind apparently differs little from 
the masculine mind." Clearly these statistics indicate 
only one thing and that is "that the women voted just about 
the same as the men."51 In other words, they showed them-
selves deaf to all appeals like those of the suffragettes 
and voted on the major issues like the men. Some states, 
however, were even said to have been turned to Wilson by 
the vote of the women. In Kansas, for example, where 
240,000 women voted for the first time, William Allen White, 
editor of the Emporia Gazette, claimed that the result in 
his state was due mainly to these votes of the women for 
Wilson. 52 The Boston Post53 and the New York Herald54 
shared this opinion while the editors of the Topeka Capitol 
and the Wichita Beacon said practically the same thing.55 
On this topic the Sacramento Union made the significant 
observation that although the women voted for the Republican 
51 World's ~, 33:118-119, December, 1916. 
52 Boston ~, November 10, 1916. 
53 Literary Digest, 53:21, November 18, 1916. 
5~ ~ ~ Herald, November 10, 1916. 
55 Literary Digest, ~. 
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candidate for Governor, nevertheless they voted for Wilson 
out of desire for peace.56 In Minnesota, the editor of 
the Duluth News Tribune claimed that woman's vote was the 
dominant factor in favor of Wilson,57 and a strong influence 
was attached to the women's vote by the San Francisco 
Chronicle 58 and the BUlletin,59 as well as the Los Angeles 
Express60 and the Seattle Post-Intelligencer.61 Looking at 
the vote of the whole country rather than at the individual 
states, the New York Times attributed great importance to 
the woman's vote in Wilson's victory as did the Harper's 
weekly in its critique of the election results. 62 
It is perhaps fitting, that we close our discus-
sion of the second artificial issue with the words of Mrs. 
Arthur Dodge, president of the National Association Opposed 
to Woman's Suffrage, in a letter to the New York Times: 
"The so-called Woman's Party ••• failed absolutely to carry 
out the purpose for which it was organized - to defeat the 
Democratic candidate in the States where women vote.,,63 
56 Sacramento Union, Nov. 15, 1916. 
57 Literary Digest, Ibid. 
58 San Francisco Chronicle, November 11, 1916. 
59 San Francisco Bulletin, November III 1916. 
60 Los Angeles Express, November 11, 1~16. 
61 Literary Digest, ~3:21, November 18, 1916. 
62 New York Times, Nov. 12, 1916; Harper's Weekly, Nov. 20, 
1916. 
63 World's ~, 33, December, 1916. 
CHAPTER III 
THREE ISSUES MADE BY THE LOSING REPUBLICANS 
Besides these "artificial" issues there were three 
issues upon which the Republican candidate laid great emphasis 
throughout his campaign. One was the rather worn out question 
of the tariff, a perennial favorite in campaigns. Another 
issue, also of frequent appearance in previous electioneering, 
was the advocation of civil service reform; this was stressed 
by Hughes because during the past administration the Demo-
cratic party had appeared guilty of partisanship in appoint-
ing unqualified Democrats to important federal offices. The 
third issue was really a criticism of the President's first 
term foreign policy. In this part of our thesis we will con-
sider only the Mexican foreign policy, for the European ques-
tion will be discussed later not as a strong point for the Re-
publicans but rather as a boon for the Democrats. 
The disagreement of the parties on the tariff was 
indicated in the platforms. The Democrats took the following 
stand: 
We reaffirm our belief in the doctrine 
of a tariff for the purpose of providing 
sufficient revenue for the operation of 
the government economically administered, 
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and unreservedly endorse the Under-
wood tariff as truly exemplifying that 
doctrine. l 
42 
Whereas the Republican platform stated that "the Republican 
party stands now, always has, ••• for the policy of tariff 
protection to American industries and American labor ••• tt 
It did not regard an anti-dumping provision as an adequate 
substitute and also went on to say that the "Underwood 
tariff act is a complete failure in every respect. tf2 
The sharp opposition of these two positions, how-
ever, was somewhat softened by the recommendations on the 
part of both parties for an advisory tariff commission that 
would give impartial study to the matter and advise the ad-
ministration accordingly. Wilson, at first opposed to 
such a board, admitted his change of opinion on the subject 
as early as January, 1916, in an address to the Railway 
Business Association in New York City. He spoke of the 
"economic revolution" going on in the world, and therefore 
the necessity for a more thorough investigation of condi-
tions than Congress was capable of because of its other pre-
occupying concerns.3 by taking this position of favoring 
a board, Wilson stole some of the thunder from the oppositio 
1 Democratic Convention, 122. 
2 Republican Convention, 168. 
3 Shaw, 156-157. 
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When, moreover, Wilson signed the measure for a Tariff Com-
mission in the very heat of the campaign on September 8, 1916 
and then secured as chairman, Frank William Taussig, long 
distinguished at Harvard as a low economist, "there was im-
plicit in this move", according to Paxson, "a Democratic 
willingness to accept the protective system as reasonable.,,4 
Naturally, the Republicans criticized the Presi-
dent's shift of opinion, but even more did Hughes, beginning 
with his acceptance speech, attack the whole tariff program. 
In almost every city of the West in which he campaigned 
Hughes gave some ti~e to this issue. The people of Tacoma, 
Portland, Coeur D'Alene, San Francisco and Los Angeles, - all 
heard Hughes speak 'against the tariff. 5 Yet the Republican 
papers in these same cities after the election attributed 
very little importance to this issue, and we fail to see why 
the people at large would favor the return of a protection-
ist policy. 
This matter of the tariff had taken on importance 
in the last twenty years. In the Congressional elections of 
1890 and 1910, the tariff question was about the only issue 
upon which the parties really differed. In 1890, following 
4 Paxson, 352. 
5 2sn Francisco Chronicle, August 14, 15, 16, 1916. 
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the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act, the Republicans 
suffered defeat, a phenomenon repeated again in 1910 subse-
quent to the passage of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909. 
These results would seem to indicate that when this issue was 
presented without complication from others the popular verdict 
was against the stubborn maintenance of a rigid protection-
ist policy.6 The depression that followed the crisis of 1907 
and continued after the passage of the tariff bill of 1909 
certainly did not enhance the position of the protectionist 
Republicans. 
Moreover, this turn from a prosperity, which the 
Republicans attributed to their protectionist policy, to a 
state of depression, was naturally a plausible opportunity for 
the Democrats in turn to attribute the depression also to this 
policy. However, the Democrats strengthened their appeal to 
the people by linking the high cost of living with the pro-
tective tariff. It was under the influence of these circum-
stances, Taussig thought, that the Republicans went down to 
defeat in the Congressional elections of 1910, and, together 
with the party split to the rout in the Presidential race of 
1912.7 
That the Democratic power was on the rise cannot be 
6 Frank W. Taussig, The Tariff history of the United States, 
Putnam's funs, 1923, 409. 
7 Ibid., 412. 
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denied. It is best seen perhaps by a glance at the following 
tables: 
61st Congress, 1909-1911 (that 
the tariff act of 1909): 
House, 214 Republicans 
175 Democrats 
62nd Congress (1911-1913): 
House, 228 Democrats 
165 Republicans 
1 Socialist 
63rd Congress (1913-1915) that 
the tariff act of 1913: 
House, 286 Democrats 
122 Republicans 
21 Progressives, 
Prog.Rep. , 
and Indep. 
which passed 
Senate, 60 Rep. 
32 Dem. 
Senate, 51 Rep. 
43 Dem. 
which passed 
Senate, 51 Dem. 
44 Rep. 8 
1 Prog. 
~ihen this surge of power brought Wilson to the 
Presidency in 1912 the Democrats lived up to their platform 
promise and under Wilson's leadership quickly engineered the 
composition and passage of the Underwood Tariff in 1913 which 
provided for a general reduction of tariff rates. In his ac-
ceptance speech of,1916, Wilson referred to this revision, 
saying, "the tariff has been revised, not on the principle 
of repelling foreign trade, but upon the princIpal of en-
couraging it. tl9 
It is hard to see how the tariff could have been 
made the main issue of the coming election unless Wilson's 
present administration had been accompanied by a great 
8 Ibid., 412. 
9 Shaw, 305. 
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depression, and this was nowhere in evidence. Trade with the 
belligerents was bringing money into the country. Since there 
was a comparatively enjoyable prosperity, one is surprised to 
find that Hughes did not leave this issue entombed in the 
black print of the platform. However, it can be said that 
issues were scarce, as the Socialists pointed out, and the 
tariff probably helped Hughes to retain the votes of the con-
servative East. But the important votes of this campaign were 
those of the Progressives, and such a traditional policy as 
the protective tariff would hardly be enough to win their 
vote. In an editorial after the election, the New York Times 
spoke very critically of this issue, saying that "the Republi-
cans had no issues, no clear policies except protection, a 
scarecrow hung out at the eleventh hour, and inciting only 
guffaws. HlO Although we need not go as far as the Times in 
our condemnation of this issue of the campaign, it probably 
lost no votes for Wilson except in those states of the East 
that had already been conceded to the Republicans. 
Another issue stressed a great deal by Hughes from 
convention time to election was Wilson's partisanship in ap-
pointing Democrats to office in place of more capable and 
skilled men. This issue was hardly important enough to swing 
an election because it was only a perennial favorite with the 
10 New York Times, November 11, 1916. 
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challenger. Besides the American people seem to concede the 
principle that to the victor belongs a certain reasonable 
amount of the spoils; or as Bryan retorted to Hughes' ac-
cusations, tithe deserving Democrat" is as much entitled to 
recognition as a deserving Republican. ll However, that the 
matter was definitely controversial was indicated by Outlook, 
which favored the Republicans in this regard and pointed out 
that even Wilson's legislation could not "make up for the 
fundamental corruption of an administrative system by the 
reintroduction of the spoils system. ,,12 
It seems that Wilson was probably guilty in this 
case for two of his biographers, who are usually favorable 
to him, admit his guilt. David Lawrence, one of these 
biographers, thought that in Wilson's administration 
••• ambassadors were selected and govern-
mental jobs of various sorts dispersed in 
panicky haste to satisfy the demands of the 
party vultures. Patronage was like so much 
debris ••• that had to be cleared away ••• 
The disregard of a civil service reform and 
the appointment of some men to ambassadorial 
or ministerial posts who would never have 
been sent as first secretaries even, had 
there been the slightest suspicion that a 
war was brewing in Europe, constituted an 
indefensible chapter of the first part of 
11 Literary Digest, 53:9, August 26, 1926. 
12 Outlook, CXIV, October 4, 1916. 
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the Wilson administration. 13 
Dodd, another biographer, also says that Wilson did not handle 
the question of civil service any too well. 
Wilson, although fully aware of the risks, 
allowed many diplomatic, consular, and 
other positions to be awarded to party 
workers. And Democratic leaders in Con-
gress more than once enacted legislation 
that tended to debauch the civil service. 14 
However, Dodd also points out that, although this difficulty 
of patronage arose between the President and his party in both 
houses of Congress throughout the administration, "as the 
matter stood when the campaign opened the administration had 
as good a record as any of its predecessors; one is constrained 
to say a better one. u15 
Among the appointments criticized two immediately 
oome to mind mainly because of the publicity given by Hearst 
to everything negative connected with the Mexican affair. 
During the Mexican crisis William Bayard Dale, an unfrocked 
clergyman and newspaper writer, was selected by Wilson as a 
personal representative to investigate conditions. Not only 
was he temperamentally unsuited16 but actually ignorant of 
the mission assigned to him. Soon after another representa-
13 David Lawrence, The ~ Story of Woodrow Wilson, New York, 
Doran Co., 1924,~5. 
14 Dodd, 181. 
15 Ibid., 182. 
16 Baker, IV, 265. 
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tive was selected to deal with Huerta and this appointment 
was just as bad. John Lind, Bryan's personal friend and the 
former Governor of Minnesota, chosen as the new mediator, was 
completely unfamiliar with Latin American affairs and untried 
in diplomatic circles. These facts, together with his in-
ability to speak Spanish, made hi~ the most unfit person who 
could have been sent. 17 
Another appointment under attack by Hughes was one 
made by Secretary of the Treasury, McAdoo, who had removed 
Henry Clapp as~ assistant appraiser of merchandise at the Port 
of New York to make way for Daniel E. Finn, a Tammany district 
leader, whom Hughes claimed was unfit and unqualified. 18 
With regard to two other publicized cases, the independent 
Springfield Republican said that the two parties were even. 
While a Mister Durand had been removed from public office 
against his will by the Administration, a Doctor Titman had 
resigned voluntarily for reasons of health from the post of 
the Superintendent of the Coast and Geodetic Survey.19 
Although there were many more dubious appointments 
these few most publicized cases are sufficient to indicate 
17 Charles W. Thompson, Rresidents I've Known and Two Near 
Presidents, Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1929, 26I: 
18 San Frgncisco Chronicle, August 13, 1916. 
19 Literary Digest, 53:9, August 26, 1916. 
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that Hughes had found a chink in the armor of Wilson's ad-
ministration. It led to many speeches by Hughes on ineffi-
ciency of government, waste of money, and particularly parti-
sanship and sectionalism in politics that resulted in putting 
incompetent men into important positions. But whether Wil-
son was guilty or not, whether Hughes gained votes or not, it 
still must be recognized as one of the major issues made by 
the Republicans. Worthy of notice too is the fact that while 
it might have accounted for the' closeness of the race it 
could not have aided Wilson in any way in winning the elec-
tion. 
Another important thrust against Wilson was made 
by the Republicans on the subject of foreign policy. hughes 
launched a critical attack in his very speech of acceptance 
in which he devoted more than half of his time to this sub-
ject. In his attacks he consistently hammered at the Mexican 
policy which, indeed, at that time and perhaps even today, 
appeared to be another sore spot in the Wilson administra-
tion. Unfortunately, Wilson was unprepared for the task of 
foreign relations with Mexico as he had himself admitted, 
stating that, "it would be the irony of fate if my ad-
ministration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs when 
my own preparations had been exclusively with domestic 
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problems. tt20 Yet in spite of his insight into his own limita-
tions, he nevertheless refused the advice of authorities on 
important matters, selected a cabinet of inexperienced poli-
ticians, and flung himself into the very depths of foreign en-
tanglements from the very beginning, as his Mexican diplomacy 
conclusively shows. 21 
Briefly the situation in Mexico developed as follows. 
When Diaz, the dictator of Mexico for thirty-five years, yield-
ed to a revolutionary movement that he could no longer sup-
press, Madero was installed as constitutional President in 
1911, but he did not keep order nor did he satisfy the aspira-
tions of the landless peons. A counter-revolution of land-
owners, supported by foreign investors, displaced him and in-
stalled Victoriana Huerta as President. Great Britain and most 
of the powers promptly recognized Huerta's government but Wil-
son refused to do the same, despite the cries of the business 
interests in this country. 
"ilatchful waiting" was the policy adopted by Wilson. 
Unfortunately, with this policy he was impliCitly encouraging 
revolution. The revolutions were supposed to convince Huerta, 
a character most obnoxious to Wilson, that he should abandon 
20 Baker, IV, 247. 
21 Ibid., 344. 
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his high ambitions and retire. Pressure from foreign coun-
tries forced Wilson to hurry the process and so he sent two 
poorly equipped ambassadors who failed to gain their object-
ives. The repeal of the canal tolls exemption clause by Con-
gress, an act done at Wilson's request, brought England to 
Wilson's side and encouraged him in his watchful waiting. 
Huerta, however, continued negotiations with the foreign pow-
ers and Wilson decided to lift the arms embargo for the bene-
fit of the constitutional forces, which meant that Villa and 
Carranza would now receive munitions openly from the United 
States. 
The Tampico incident and the ABC mediation brought 
a brief respite, but soon Carranza, Villa, and Zapeta were 
taking turns in overrunning Mexico City. The mediation of 
South American countries was again invited, and this time af-
ter conferences of these countries with Secretary of State 
Lansing, the Carrancista party by some strange process of 
reasoning was chosen as the only party possessing the essen-
tials for recognition as the de facto government. The United 
States then recognized Carranza as the chief executive of 
Mexico, and Wilson simultaneously procla~ an embargo on arms 
to Mexico, except for the newly organized government. 
Villa's reaction, the murder of 16 American en-
gineers, brought more trouble, but when armed intervention was 
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recommended, Wilson preferred to take Carranza1s worthless 
promise that he would pursue justice in this case. 22 When 
Villa continued raids upon New Mexico, Wilson called out the 
militia to pursue Villa into Mexican territory. Carranza ap-
peared cooperative at first, but then he definitely refused 
our soldiers .the use of all Mexican transportation facilities; 
his next step was a bitter condemnation of American invasion 
on Mexican soil as "a move that could easily lead to war.,,23 
In June war was almost declared when several clashes occurred 
between some men of Pershing
' 
s command and Ihexicans at Parral, 
and a collision with a force of Carranza's troops at Carrizal. 
The United States President was still determined to 
keep peace and so adopted Lansing's suggestion of a joint 
Mexican-American commission to reach an understanding. The 
net result of the New London Conference was a victory for 
Mexican diplomacy; the withdrawal of American troops from Mexi 
can territory; the restoration of full diplomatic relations 
between the two countries; and the decision to patrol the 
borders rigorously against further raids. These events bring 
us to the closing month of the campaign. 
Then as now, to many Wilson's policy was the 
22 Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United 
States, Harcourt, Bruce & Co., New York, 1943, 181. 
23 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States,Government Printing Press, Washington, 1913, 486. 
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combination of delayed recognition and meddling in Mexico's 
internal affairs, while to others it was an example of re-
markable patience, unselfishness and sincerity that paved 
the way for his moral leadership of Europe. 24 Some will 
point to the four hundred American civilians killed in Mexico 
or to the one hundred and seventy million dollars lost to 
American businessmen. 25 Wilson's defenders, however, will 
say that his refusal to be forced into war with Mexico saved 
many more lives, made unnecessary prolonged policing meas-
ures, and did much to remove the suspicion with which our 
policies in the Caribbean were regarded by our southern 
neighbors. 
With regard to the recognition of Huerta, Wilson 
was criticized by some for departing from the traditional 
course of the United States of recognizing de facto govern-
ments. The easiest and wisest course, they claim, would 
have been to grant recognition to the Huerta government and 
leave to Huerta and the Mexicans the solution of their 
problems of constitutional law and democracy. The policy 
adopted by Wilson, however, was one that introduced moral 
considerations into the realm of international law, a 
24 J. Latane & O. Wainhouse, American Foreign Policy, Odyssey 
Press, New York, 1940, 602. 
25 Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United, States, Henry 
Holt, New York, 542-543 (cf. footnotes). 
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dangerous procedure since it placed upon the U.S. the re-
sponsibility of deciding which government was moral and of 
establishing that government. 
It is not our purpose here to decide which course 
would have been best in the Mexican crisis for that would de-
mand a long and comprehensive study of a question that is 
still among the unsolved problems of history. However, the 
above facts are necessary to show upon what grounds the Re-
publicans based their attack. 
While Hughes and Lodge recommended intervention in 
the Mexican crisis, Hughes in his acceptance speech merely 
denounced Wilson's tlvacillation" and demanded a "new policy" 
without specifying what it should be. 26 This attitude was 
rather typical of the rest of his campaign speeches. Hughes 
claimed that Wilson should have insisted upon protection of 
the lives and property of American citizens. If Huerta and 
his government could not discharge this function, then the 
U. S. should not have recognized him but instead our ad-
ministration said to Huerta, ttyou, get out~" and recognition 
was given to Carranza. The attack of some Mexicans under 
Villa that killed 19 Americans was war, and yet we allowed 
the Mexicans to spill blood, coquetted with Villa, with 
26 New York Times, August 1, 1916. 
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Carranza. The administration was also to blame for the 
anarchy that prevailed in Mexico, for leaving our citizens a 
prey to the ravages of revolution, and for making our name a 
word of contempt in a riotous republic. tilt was a miserable, 
petty war brought about by weakness and ignorance, by incom-
petence and blundering.,,27 
It was probably very fortunate for President Wil-
son that the Mexican crisis abated somewhat a month or so be-
fore the election. There was a decided number of Americans 
clamoring for intervention and they were not only the war-
hawks and the believers of the jingoistic press but a number 
of people usually pacifistic in outlook. The Roman Catho-
lics were also a sizeable minority who disagreed with Wil-
son's maneuverings. Even the rviexicans were not sold on the 
President's 'watchful waiting', at least if one can believe 
an article in Outlook magazine just before the election that 
contained condemnations of Wilson by First Chief Carranza, 
the Secretary of War Obregon, the Mexican Secretary of 
Foreign Relations Aguilar, and a leading general of the 
army.28 Few papers expressed the convictions of the Spring-
field Republicans that "it is impossible not to have faith 
27 ~iterarY Diyest~ 53: 8, August 19, 1916. 28 utlook, CL V, ~ovember 1, 1915. 
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that President Wilson is still on the right track and facing 
in the right direction." 29 
At any rate, how this issue of the Mexican policy 
affected the election is a question difficult to answer. It 
could have been one of the main reasons for the closeness of 
the contest. One reason that inclines us to believe this was 
that the aggressive and openly hostile attitude of the Catho-
lic papers unified when Wilson expressed his fondness for the 
anti-clerical Carranza and even aided him with military sup-
plies. Catholic blood flowing in the streets of Mexico stirre 
the sympathies of American Catholics to a distaste for Wilson 
and his policy. However, since Catholic criticism of Wilson 
was found chiefly in Catholic newspapers and periodicals of 
very limited circulation, the united stand of Catholics 
against Wilson cannot be certain, especially when these few 
organs of publicity were not unanimous in condemning voting 
for Wilson. That Tumulty was worried and even the President, 
over the antagonism of the Church, and that he tried to pla-
cate its members, seems to be indicated by a letter of the 
Roman Catholic Tumulty to an obligingly inquisitive friend; 
for in this letter he attempted to explain away the whole 
29 Current Opinion, LXI, No.3, September, 1916. 
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Mexican persecution as an exaggeration. 
However, the newspapers of the country seem to 
give no importance to its part in the election except as a 
verification of the Democratic slogan, tlHe kept us out of 
war." That Hughes' attacks upon Wilson's "meddling" brought 
him any votes is almost impossible to prove, especially since 
the papers concentrate upon what lost votes for the chal-
lenger rather than what gained votes for him. At the most 
we can say that the Republicans in the election of 1916 
succeeded in making a major iss~e of Wilson's Mexican policy 
but failed to make it a winning issue. 
This brings to a close our brief discussion of the 
major issues made by Hughes and the Republican party. From 
the general tenor of the issues it is easy to understand why 
the post-election surveys blamed the Republicans and Hughes 
for making the campaign predominately tfcritical tl rather than 
constructive. 
-CHAPTER IV 
THE WAR ISSUE: A DEMOCRATIC SUCCESS 
The winning strategy of the Democrats centered upon 
two policies: first, the President's successful prevention of 
an American entrance into war despite the occasion for such a 
course, and secondly, his indisputable record of progressive 
legislationo Though at times one or the other of these ele-
ments was stressed, it seems that the combination of both was 
just too much for the Republicans. Because of the importance 
attributed by newspapers and authors to these two factors we 
have limited our discussion to them as the main vote-getters 
for the Democrats. In our discussion we will emphasize their 
special importance in the West because it was in the ,~-est that 
Wilson found the votes that tipped the scales ever so slightly 
in his favor. Since the contest was so close we will be look-
ing for elements in Wilson's favor, and this purpose, rather 
than partiality to Wilson's cause, will determine the selection 
of quotations. 
Many commentators thought that the main issue of the 
election was provided by the threatening war. It certainly 
accentuated our relations with the belligerent countries which 
were proving to be an extremely difficult problem and as 
59 
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complicated in the early part of the war as was public opinion 
in this melting pot of millions of hyphenated Americans, Wil-
son's early appeal on August 18, 1914, urging the American 
people to be "impartial in thought as well as in action" was 
asking the impossible. A rhyme from the New York Sun gave 
humorous expression to this not-tao-humorous and rather com-
plex situation: 
The barber to the right of me hoching for 
the Kaiser, 
The barber to the left of me was hacking 
for the Czar. 
A gentleman from Greece was shearing off 
my fleece, 
While very near a swart Italian ~stropped 
his scimitar. 
And when presently discussion, polyglot 
and fervid, 
On political conditions burst about my 
chair, 
I left the place unshaven - I hope I'm not 
a craven 
But I sort of like to wear a head beneath 
my hair~l 
Accordingly, the United States soon became a fer-
tile field for the propagandists of the belligerents. But as 
early as November, 1914 in a poll conducted by the Literary 
Digest, of the 367 editors who replied only 20 favored the Ger-
mans while 105 favored the Allies and 242 remained neutral. 
This was even before the English propagandists launched their 
1 C::uoted by Mark Sullivan, Our Times, Scribner's Sons, New 
York, 1933, v, 140-141. 
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successful campaign in the United States. 2 In general, "the 
sympathies of the Americans lay on the side of Great Britain, 
France and the other allies. Relations with Great Britain 
had on the whole been friendly since the recent repeal of the 
canal tolls exemption clause.,,3 Then, too, the Americans 
were always partial to the French. On the other hand, Ger-
man-American relations had not been particularly friendly 
since the eighties and by 1914 the American people "had come 
to regard German militarism and navalism as an international 
menace." Moreover, Uthe ruthless invasion of Belgium, des-
pite a solemn treaty obligation to respect her neutrality, 
merely confirmed the deepest American suspicions." And then 
to make matters worse, "the German Chancellor blunderingly 
explained that the Belgian neutrality was but a scrap of 
paper. fl4 Needless to say big America sympathized with 
little Belgium. 
Despite this growing sentiment in favor of the 
Allies, when convention time arrived before the 1916 election 
both parties advocated neutrality in their respective plat-
forms, together with the firm defense of American rights. 
2 See J. D. Squires, British Propaganda at Home and in the 
United States from 1914-1212; Carl Wittke, German-Americans 
and the World War; Peterson, Propaganda ill ~~ar. 
3 Bailey, £R.cit., b12. 
4 Ibid., 612. 
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This seemed the wisest policy because the American people 
still preferred peace and had not as yet been completely 
turned against either side. At this point American desires 
did not include a victory that involved American participa-
tion on the side of one of the belligerents. 
policy. 
Another factor made neutrality the more popular 
As Baker points out: 
One element or condition of the approach-
ing campaign which was of the utmost im-
portance ought to be here considered: this 
was the relative lull in American diplo-
matic activity which began in ~ay, before 
the conventions, and continued until after 
the elections in November. It applies not 
only to Europe but also to Mexico. For 
five months, while there were indeed irri-
tating controversies, especially with the 
British regarding the black list, no really 
acute foreign crisis disturbed American 
life or influenced opinion. It is only 
in the after look that the immense political 
importance can be fully recognized. The 
campaign so far as the slogan "He kept us 
out of w~r" was concerned largely turned 
upon it., 
Preparedness was also a major plank in both plat-
forms for this policy had been brought before the people by 
the many preparedness parades of May and June. Tumulty 
claimed that they were part of a political movement led by 
Wood, to mention one, to embarrass the President and Congress 
into passing some radical legislation. 6 Be that as it may, 
5 Baker, 242. 
6 Tumult 246-247. 
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the number of people taking part in these parades was in six 
figures and that in New York was described as "the greatest 
civilian demonstration in the history of the world." As 
the political importance of these parades was more obvious 
to Tumulty than to the President, it was by Tumulty's maneu-
vering that the President not only was invited but also took 
part in the parade at Washington, marching at its head on 
the very day that the Democratic convention was meeting in St 
Louis. "By getting into the 'front line,' the President, 
argued Tumulty, had c1:uerly outwitted his enemies and took 
command of the forces in the country demanding preparedness.1I7 
Wilson made other appropriate gestures toward the 
more militant elements in the country with the preparedness 
measures that were pushed through Congress dur:l.ng the few 
months previous to the election. The National Defense Act 
of June 23 enlarged the regular army to 175,000, strengthened 
the National Guard, and provided tor an officer's reserve 
corps. The Naval Appropriations Bill of August 29, author~ 
ized the construction of a large number of new dreadnoughts, 
battle cruisers, and minor warcraft; and since the Democratic 
party was likewise converted to building up the Merchant 
Marine, the United States Shipping Board Act of September 7th 
7 Ibid., 247. 
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appropriated fifty million dollars for the purchase or con-
struction of merchant ships. Finally to coordinate in-
dustries and resources for defense, Congress created a Coun-
cil of National Defense, consisting of six cabinet members 
and an advisory board drawn from the ranks of industry and 
labor. That these measures were not adequate nor of the 
radical type that Tumulty had feared, need not concern us 
here. It is more to the point to note that they were enough 
to placate the midly militant Americans who demanded the pro-
tection of American lives on the high seas, and likewise 
enough to enable the Democrats to boast of a program that 
embraced both preparedness and neutrality. For "had the 
Democrats attempted to run on a straight pacifist platform 
they would almost certainly have been defeated. 8 The slo-
gan, ttH.e kept us out of war," proved to be a "safe means of 
tapping the powerful sentiment for peace without too far 
alienating the war hawks. tt9 
The Republican party strategists had refused to 
make an issue out of the threatening war by nominating 
Roosevelt or Wood, and wisely so because they realized that 
the country still wanted peace. But now that their platform 
practically agreed with the Democrats on the issue they 
8 Millis, 320. 
9 IQiQ.., 320. 
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could only denounce Wilsonian "weakness" in maintaining 
American rights abroad, and even then they had to be care-
ful because they were straddling the affections of both the 
English and the German-Americans. They were, as someone 
phrased it, "beating drums up both streets;" hence their 
platform also blazed with nationalistic fervor, giving of-
fense to no one. 
Hughes' acceptance speech fell right in line with 
the platform. He spoke of "America first and America efri 
cient" and dedicated himself to the "unflinching mainten-
ance of all American rights on land and sea." He stressed 
a "firm American policy" but the obvious question was imme-
diately asked by the hostile Democratic papers, - "What 
does 'firm' mean?ulO An independent paper, the Springfield 
Republican, was quoted by the Digest as giving a "careful 
criticism" of the speech. After reviewing Mr. Hughes' 
condemnation of President Wilson's policy with reference to 
the European war the paper asked: 
What would Mr. Hughes do with refer-
ence to the European war, in case he were 
to be elected? Would he join one side or 
the other? Would he forthwith demand 
specific disavowal from Germany of the 
Lusitania's sinking? Would he threaten 
10 New York Viorld, August 1, 1916 
r 
England with reprisals on account of 
the blockade? No one would know from 
this speech what Mr. Hughes would do, but 
we do know with sufficient precision what 
to expect of President Wilson. ll 
Throughout most of the campaign speeches Hughes 
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seemed to follow this course, that is, he offered no alter-
native to the policy of Wilson but advocated the same thing 
in a more vfirmu way. He constantly criticized and con-
demned Wilson's missteps. Both he and the other Republicans 
found fault witn Wilson not for keeping us out of war but 
for doing so by methods which were humiliating in the ex-
treme, sacrificed national honor and surrendered its posi-
tion as the defender of its own rights and the rights of 
neutrals in the face of flagrant wrongs against which the 
President had protested - on paper. 
It was a very delicate position for Hughes 
especially when one of his colleagues, Theodore Roosevelt, 
was speaking in a fashion much more aggressive. Roose-
veltfs hatred of Wilson led him into undignified outbursts 
and to extremities of statement that were irrjtating and em-
barrassing to Hughes and his managers,12 for implicit at 
least was the suggestion that we should have gone to war. 
11 Literary Digest, 53:7, August 12, 1916. 
12 Baker, 289 (footnote). 
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The Colonel's attacks upon the foreign policy of the adminis-
tration were violent and persistent. He characterized the 
statement 'He kept us out of war' as an "Utterly misleading 
phrase, the phrase of a coward, and distorted it into a prom-
ise that under no circumstances could we go to war."13 lie 
also declared that if he had been president when the Lusitania 
was sunk, he would have seized every German vessel interned in 
Amepican waters. 14 But the speech that was perhaps the climax 
of tte Colonel's outbursts and of his campaigning was given at 
Cooper Union in New York on November 3rd. As he reached the 
end of his flaming speech, Mr. Millis notes that "he tossed his 
manuscript aside and trembling with emotion uttered the soul 
cry of the true patriot:"15 
There should be shadows now at Shadow 
Lawn: (Wilson's Summer home) the shadows 
of the men, women and children who have 
risen from graves in foreign lands; the 
shadows of the helpless whom Mr. Wilson 
did not dare protect lest he might have 
to face danger: the shadows of babies 
gasping pitifully as they sink under the 
waves; the shadows of women outraged and 
slain by bandits ••• Those are the shadows 
proper for Shadow Lawn; the shadows of 
deeds that were never done; the shadow of 
i~;t~h:~~~~ ~~a~h:e~~r{~;!~W~~a~:lgo action; 
13 New York Times, October 11, 1916. 
14 Ibid., October 1, 1916. 
15 Millis, 349. 
16 New York Times, November 4, 1916. 
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Speeches such as this seemed to put hughes in an impossible 
situation. Like Wilson he knew the sentiment of t~e country: 
it did not want war. How could he then, or the Republican 
managers, approve the incendiary proposals of Roosevelt, who 
was going up and down the country insisting that "the time for 
the ostrich policy, the time for the head-in-a-hole policy, in 
America is past~"l? 
Wilson capitalized on the situation, and in a speech 
at Shadow Lawn on September 30th he said: "The certain pros-
pect of the success of tee Republican party is that we shall be 
drawn in one form or another into tte embroilments of the 
European War."18 As if to prove it, Roosevelt, campaigning 
for Hughes at Battle Creek on that very day was shouting: 
"President Wilson by his policy of tame submission to insult 
and injury from all whom he feared, has invited the murder of 
our men, women and children by ••• German submarines at sea.,,19 
It was said that the Democrats "cheerfully reprinted this 
passionate effusion and spread it broadcast over the radical-
pacifist Northwest. tt20 It was a commitment of the Republi-
cans to war in event that the German pledge on submarine war-
fare was broken. 
17 Ibid., October 10, 1916 
18 Ibid., October 1, 1916 
19 Ibid. 
20 MITTis, 343. 
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A few days before the campaign ended Hughes added a 
statement indicative perhaps of his fear of the effect of 
Roosevelt's speeches: itA vote for me is not a vote for war. 
It is a vote for lasting peace, it is a vote for the mainten-
ance of American rights on land and sea, throughout the 
world.,,21 Late in the campaign Hughes was also forced to give 
his views upon two important incidents involving America. One 
expression of opinion was forced by a heckler who put the 
. question to Hughes point-blank: "What would you have done when 
the Lusitania was sunk?" Hughes answered: 
••• when I said 'strict accountability' 
every nation would have know that that was 
meant; and further when notice was pub-
lished with respect to the action, I would 
have made it known in terms unequivocal 
and unmistakable, that we should not tolerate 
a continuance of friendly relations through 
the ordinary diplomatic channels if that 
action were taken, an~ the Lusitania would 
never have been sunk. 2 
This, Baker claimed, "was the one important respect in which 
Hughes said that he would have taken a more advanced step than 
the President."23 
On the issue of nblack-1isting" and the violation of 
property it seems that Hughes, despite the criticism of Wil-
son's methods, agreed with him. On October 9th he said: 
21 New fork Times, October 1, 1916. 
22 Ibid., October 13, 1916. 
32 Baker, 288. 
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I do not put life and property on the 
same footing ••• We do not propose to 
tolerate any improper interference with 
Americ.an property, with American mails, or 
with legitimate commercial intercourse. No 
American who is exercising only American 
rights shall be put on any black list by any 
foreign nation. 24 
The open struggle of the Wilsonian administration to 
maintain neutrality could carry no pledge of non-participation, 
and Wilson, neither before or after his nomination, promised 
more than an effort to avoid war. Indeed, as early as May 30, 
Wilson had made it clear that he was no doctrinaire pacifist. 
Everyone understood that war at times was necessary and bene-
ficial. "The Union was saved by the processes of the Civil 
War" 25 and America while passionately desirous of peace, 
might have to fight again. 26 This attitude, however, was 
wholly different from militarism which he did not care to find 
prevalent in America. 27 
Little else, however, was said for the President than 
that he kept the nation out of war. But, "it was certainly 
never the President's intent to rest the most important phase 
of his record - his attitude toward the European War - upon thi 
naive generality ••• "28 Of course, Wilson was aware of the 
implication of the phrase and he gave indications that he did 
not like the phrase, even though he could not object to it. 
24 New York Times, October 10, 1916. 
~~ ~~~~~n~n~4bodd, IV, 194. 
28 ~r' ~ . 
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Once he remarked to Secretary Daniels: "I can't keep the 
country out of war. They talk of me as though I were a god." 
Then he added: "Any little German lieutenant can put us into 
the war at any ti;ne by some calculated outrage. tl29 If the 
country had been plunged into war this campaign phrase could 
easily have backfired and blasted his hopes of reelection. 
To the people this phrase seemed to mean that Wilson 
was earnestly and honestly seeking to keep out of war. His 
heSitation, his continued and determined efforts for peace, 
his mental debates, seemed to express the mind of a good per-
centage of the American people. Besides the mention in his 
speeches of his avoidance of war he often referred to the 
moral leadership of America in this crisis, to the impossi-
bility of isolation in the future, and to the League of Na-
tions, but it is very doubtful that these ideas were appre-
ciated by the people at large. The slogan seemed to be the 
all-important part of the Democratic stand on the war issue 
and that they relied upon its appeal is seen in appeals such 
as the following just before the election: 
29 Baker, 258. 
You are WORKING 
- Not Fighting 
Alive and Happy 
- Not Cannon Fodder~ 
r 
Wilson and Peace with Honor? 
or 
Hughes with Roosevelt and war?30 
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Every reference to t~is slogan and to peace carried a 
conscious allusion to what the policies of Theodore Roosevelt 
and the Republicans might have brought to pass had he been in 
the White House. When the Republicans criticized his foreign 
policy Wilson had a tactical advantage, for his policy had al-
ready been tried and any radical change would only lead to war. 
Obviously this was not a necessary outcome of a Republican vic-
tory but the Democrats played upon the people's alarm to en-
hance their own chance of winning. 
Thus were the cards stacked on the war issue. Only a 
general outline has been given because a detailed accowlt of 
all the prewar events and diplomatic relations was thought un-
necessary for our purposes here. It seemed sufficient to note 
the stand of the parties, and the strategy employed. The one 
party could stand a successful record in keeping the country 
out of war, could point to an all-important slogan and could 
imply that a change might mean war. The other party was 
forced to criticize a policy of peace, had no catchy slogan, an 
seemed to be weakened by the militant speeches of one of its 
prominent members who worked almost at cross-purposes witn the 
challenging candidate. 
30 ~ ~ Times, November 4, 1916 (Paid advertisement) 
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We are not surprised, then, to see the following cap-
tion on one of the leading articles in the New Yor~ Times on 
November 12: "Peace a Powerful Issue - 'He Kept Us Out Of War' 
Won Women ••• was the greatest argument, East and V.:est, but 
especially the West. In the West it appealed to hatred of war, 
in the midwest to pacifism.,,31 That the people voted Wilson 
because of the war issue was the opinion of the San Francisco 
Bulletin and Chronicle.32 The San Jose M.ercury Herald 
thought "that the slogan swung states usually Republican" like 
New Hampshire33 and the Sacramento Union claimed the tlcall of 
humani ty impelled the West to vote for Vdlson" and his policy 
of peace. 34 The Los Angeles Express and the Spokane Spokes-
man attributed importance to the slogan, while the Seattle 
Post-Intelligencer gave top-rank influence to the appeal of the 
slogan to women.35 This same attitude was shown in the mid-
western Wilsonian states: In Kansas by the Emporia Gazette and 
Wichita Beacon and in Minnesota by the Duluth News Tribune.36 
The lone Wilson state in New England, New nampshire, attributed 
second largest influence to the slogan; while "Independent" (Ear 
per's Weekly) a week after the election said that the prime 
31 New I2rk Times, November 12, 1916. 
32 San Francisco Bulletin and the San Francisco Chronicle, 
November 10, 11, 1916. ----
33 San Jose Mercury-Herald, November 9, 1916. 
34 Sacramento Union, November 10, 1916. 
35 Literary Digest, 53:21, November 18, 1916. 
36 Ibid. 
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element apparent in the election returns was the approval by 
the country of the President's success in "keeping us out of 
war. tt36a From these comments it appears that 
The closing wee~~s of the canvass clarified 
the antithesis between the neutrality that 
Wilson cherished and its only alternative, 
which was war. It made him votes that he 
was not a swashbuckler, and he needed all 
of them to overcome the normal Republican 
drift.37 
The domination of the war motive is easily understood 
if an article of the Literary Digest just before the election 
was an indication of what the American people were thinking 
about. Entitled "What the War is Costing in Men," it was set 
off by a drawing of a ~orrent of dead bodies going over the 
waterfalls of war; the caption was "The Ceaseless Torrent". 
Included in the article were the sobering figures of the war 
dead. The count at that time was 711,000 deaths. 38 The ef-
fect of this article upon women readers served to heighten the 
importance of the Democratic slogan. 
When looking for influential factors that went hand 
in hand with this war issue we cannot overlook the work of 
Bryan, for apart from the South, the Wilson majorities came 
mainly from the territory in which Bryan did his campaigning 
36a Independent, 88:3546, November 4, 1916. 
37 Paxson, 263-4. 
38 Literary Digest, 53:19, November 4, 1916. 
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for Wilson. "This campaigning took Mr. Bryan through nineteen 
states in eight weeks, during which time he made four or five 
speeches a day."39 This last statement takes on greater sig 
nificance when we add two remarks made by the San Jose Mercury 
herald to the effect that probably no one had "larger or more 
appreciative audiences" than Bryan and that "the one issue 
which appealed to his tender sensibilities was that of peace!'4 
Even the Post of far-eastern Boston speaks of Bryan as the de-
ciding factor in the Nebraska vote. 4l At any rate it seems 
more than a mere coincidence that only one of the states cov-
ered by Bryan went Republican. 42 As someone said of him, 
nhis mood is the mood of the West." And when he added his 
oratorical ability to this sympathetic attitude toward the 
western people, stressing that the President should not be re-
buked 'for keeping the country out of war with Ivlexico and 
Europe, and playing upon the important slogan, we can feel 
reasonably sure that the vote of many western8:'s was influenced 
by Bryan. The Chicago Tribune thought that Bryan "was more 
responsible for Wilson than he was four years ago," but having 
the Tribune on one's side is no help so we'll forget their 
39 P. Hibben, William Jennings Bryan, Farrar & Rinehart, 
New York, 1929, 354. 
40 San Jose Mercury-Herald, November 16, 1916. 
41 Boston Post, November 11, 1916 
42 Hibben, ibid., 354. 
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remark. However, we will note that Woodrow Wilson himself 
seemed to attribute a great deal to Bryan from the following 
acknowledgment: 
May I not say how much I admire your 
part in the campaign and what a vast deal 
of effective work you seem to have done 
in the very part of the country which 
has now aligned itself with the forces 
of progress. I think that all Democra~~ 
are grateful to you. Certainly I am. j 
The few representative newspapers quoted were 
selected from the west because of its recognized importance 
in the reelection of Wilson. The Literary Digest in making 
its poll of the various Republican editors likewise concen-
trated upon the j,est and midwest. Thus far we have seen 
that the facts and a cross-section of opinions indicate that 
the war issue with its effective slogan was a very important 
factor in the Democratic victory. We will now consider the 
other predominant factor in Wilson's favor, at least in the 
western states, and that is, his successful bid for the 
Progressive vote. 
43 Ibid., 354. 
-CHAPTER V 
THE DEMOCRATIC APPEAL TO THE PROGRESSIVES 
By adding the Republican and the Progressive votes 
of 1912 Justice Hughes appeared certain of victory. Theoret-
ically the union of the two was very possible but we1ve seen 
that the Progressives had almost a nostalgic devotion to 
Teddy Roosevelt and when he refused to run and supported the 
candidacy of Hughes, many of his followers were sadly dis-
appointed, others angry. During their convention the Pro-
gressives had summarily refused to nominate Hughes, and when 
after the convention they were called in special session to 
endorse him whole-heartedly, the request proved impossible. 
That their allegiance was divided is evident from the results 
of the election. 
The Democratic administration, on the other hand, 
had to hold tight to the votes that were consistently Demo-
cratic and pick up its working majority from other sources. 
This was to be done by attracting the votes of political in-
dependents and Republicans who for some reason or other were 
dissatisfied. The Republicans boasted a unified front but 
the break with the Progressives was obviously not healed for 
as the North American phrased it, "the Progressives who left 
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the ~epublican party four years ago have no more affection or 
veneration for it now than they had had then."38 Thus the 
Democrats knew where to look for the necessary notes. By earl 
June, even before the Republican and Progressive conventions 
had met, the Democratic leaders had settled upon the two 
broad policies by which they would appeal to the people. We 
have seen how in the knowledge that the country was opposed to 
war, they offered the record of the administration in keeping 
out of it. The country was still progressive; as the other 
policy they would offer the record of the Wilson administra-
tion in progressive legislation in their belief that Wilson 
would even continue to advocate more legislation of this type 
in the brief period before the close of Congress. 
Before the Democratic convention met in June, 
Colonel House had written to Wilson, tlNow that Hughes is the 
candidate, it is all the more necessary for us to gather in 
the Progressive vote. I think that we can show Hughes up as 
a thorough conservative. tl39 From the beginning of the cam-
paign, House insisted that the Democrats must work to capture 
the Independent vote and the Progressives of the West. The 
entire strategy was to be founded upon the principle of per-
mitting the Republicans to spend their efforts and money on 
38 Current Opinion, LXI, 2, August, 1916. 
39 Seymour, I, 346, 347. 
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the anti-Wilson states east of the Mississippi and north of 
the Ohio, while the Democrats would hope to win the West, 
which, with the South, would supply the necessary majority.40 
Since the Progres~ives were aware of the appeal of 
Wilson's record, those who returned to the Republican fold 
realized that it must be discredited. With this in mind, an 
advertisement sponsored by the Republicans provides us with an 
inSight into their tactics. It was a two page article in the 
Literary Digest appearing in late September that tried to 
cover up the truth, at least so it appears to me. It read: 
"Wilson l s H-acord Should Make Every Progressive Vote For 
Hughes. 1I In the rest of the article the author, Gifford 
Pinchot, a Progressive seems to ignore deliberately tae very 
foundation of the Progressive platform, the social and econom-
ic issues, and rather concentrates on MeXico, and the civil 
service reform. 41 This example was followed by another 
Progressive, Charles Bonaparte, former Secretary of Navy and 
after that Attorney General under Roosevelt when, in a similar 
article entitled, "'\fihy I must Vote For Hughes; fI he, too, a t-
tacked Wilson primarily on civil service and his failure tO I 
protect the constitutional rights of American citizens in 
Mexico and Germany.42 But another Progressive who had bolted 
40 Ibid., 347. 
41 Literary Digest, 53: , Sept. 30, 1916. 
42 Outlook, CXIV, October 11, 1916. 
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the Republican party in 1912 was admittedly having trouble as 
he turned to prepare his campaign speeches in behalf of the 
Republican party. It was no easy task for Albert Beveridge to 
speak against Wilson, and his embarrassing position seems to 
give the lie to Pinchot's outburst as well as mirror more cor-
rectly the difficult position of the Progressive. 
idge said of himself: 
He had long urged currency reform upon 
As Bever-
his party without effect, and Wilson had 
created the Federal Reserve System over Re-
publican opposition. He had vainly sought 
to interest his party and Mr. Roosevelt in 
child-labor legislation and Wilson forced its 
enactment •••• He had been the first in years 
to fight for a tariff commission, and Wilson 
had created one. He had proposed the estab-
lishment of a clearing house where business 
men might learn their rights and find pro-
tection against unscrupulous competition and 
Wilson had given them the Federal Trade Com-
mission. He had bitterly denounced the tariff 
lobby in 1909, and in 1913 Wilson literally 
had scourged it from the Capitol. And if the 
Underwood tariff did not meet with his appro-
val, it more nearly accorded with his views 
than the last Republican tariff act which he 
had fought beroically. Clearly, it was not 
to be a simple matter to frame a militant 
campaign against an administration with such 
a record. 4j 
This was a resume of Wilson's legislative record 
which needs further amplification to show its appeal to the 
Progressives. Wilson's legislating had begun when the Under-
43 Claude Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, Literary 
Guild, New York, 1932, 491. 
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wood Tariff became a law in October, 1913. As Mr. Beveridge 
intimated, though it was not perfect, it was at least a de-
cided improvement over the Wilson-Gorman and Payne-Aldrich 
tariffs. Currency reform providing for a new national banking 
system was brought about by the Federal Reserve Act of De-
cember, 1913. Then Wilson sought to fulfill the most emphatic 
of the party pledges, "the enactment of such additional legis-
lation as may be necessary to make it impossible for a private 
monopoly to exist in the United States."44 Roosevelt had 
failed to obtain such legislation from a recalcitrant Con-
gress, and Taft had not even tried. Wilson's efforts result-
ed in the passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the 
Clayton Anti-Trust Act. The former authorized a commission 
to investigate corporations engaged in interstate commerce, 
all alleged violations of the anti-trust laws, and to issue 
'cease and desist' orders against any corporation found guilty 
of unfair methods of competition. The latter was more sweep-
ing in its provisions: 
It forbade rebates, tying contracts, 
price di~criminations, price cutting to 
restrain trade, the ownership of stock in 
competing companies, and interlocking 
directorates in banks and large businesses. 
44 Democratic ~ ~, 1912, The Democratic National 
Committee, New York, 6. 
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Officers of corporations were made per-
sonally responsible. Competitors when 
injured were allowed to use the injunc-
tion and to utilize evidence unearthed 
by the government. 45 
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Mainly because the use of injunctions in labor disputes was 
explicitly forbidden, it was hailed by Gompers as labor's 
charter of freedom. 
Other legislation not mentioned by Beveridge was 
the Seaman's Act of 1915 which at least intended to do much 
for the sailor's wellbeing and abolished the crime of de-
sertion in the American Merchant Marine. James Truslow 
Adams remarked that this Act, together with the farm legis-
lation, "at least showed a marked and proper interest in 
the welfare of the ordinary man, instead of the larger busi-
ness interests which had formerly considered the government 
as rather peculiarly a perquisite of their own. rt46 More-
over, the Alaska Railway Act of 1914 provided for the con-
struction, operation, and ownership of Alaskan railroads by 
the Federal Government, and the Smi ttl-Lever Act of 1914 pro-
vided millions of dollars for farm demonstration work in 
every rural county in the country. 
45 E. Smith and S. Zurcher, Dictionary of American Politics, 
Barnes and Noble, 1944, 57. 
46 James Truslow Adams, History of the United States, 
Scribners, New York, 1933, 198. 
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These acts appealed to many Progressives in the same 
way that they appealed to Beveridge. Naturally they were un-
palatable to big business and conservative moneyed interests 
who felt the challenge to their power and to their profits, 
but they were staunch Republicans anyway so that their in-
terests would remain unchanged. 
This was only the legislation enacted before the cam 
paign began. But before we go on to the other important 
legislation it would be well to take a glance at the rival 
party, its platform and its candidate. Noticeably lacking in 
the Republican platform was the specific labor measures men-
tioned in the Democratic platform. As Mr. Beveridge, the 
Republican-Progressive-Republican, said to one of his col-
leagues: tlWhat has become of the wonderful platform, especiall 
the economic features? Has it all been abandoned for what you 
say is now 'Americanism,' preparedness, and a protective tar-
iff? u47 Together with the labor and economic omissions, 
recommendations for farming legislation was a glaring omission 
when compared with the excellent measures proposed by the 
Democrats. I mention this only because these omissions were 
frequently commented upon by the Progressives during and after 
the campaign. 
47 Bowers, 489. 
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The acceptance speec£l of hughes appealed no more 
to the Progressives than did the Republican platform. The 
bpringfield Republican in summing up the speech reflected 
this disappointment: 
The impression one receives froin lVlr. 
Hughes' notification speech is one of 
solidity, and perhaps heaviness rather 
than brilliancy. It is likely to appeal 
to many of the Republican candidate's more 
conservative supporters as a careful and 
strong indictment of the present administra-
tion, with no display of flightiness or in-
stability in the discussion of construct-
ive policies. It seems les~ calculated to 
satisfy the radical wing of the Republican 
party, as the Progressives returning with 
Mr. Roosevelt may be called. There is no 
attention given to the policies of social 
and industrial justice which were the back-
bone of the Progressive movement, while 
there is little to suggest Rooseveltian 
fervor and conviction in the discussion of 
later issues of preparedness and American-
ism.48 
President Eliot of Harvard, an impartial observer, voiced 
somewhat the same criticisrr: in saying that it was "filled 
with universally accepted statements concerning the proper 
national policies and general descriptions of what ought to 
be done and ought not to be done by national administrations.' 
His comment that it was lacking in "exact measures tl could be 
48 Literary Digest, 53:7, August 12, 337. 
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said of Hughes' other campaign s~eeches.49 
During the campaign Wilson had the great advantage 
of being a President in power. "He could act: he CQuld keep 
the eyes cif the country constantly upon him."50 It was 
easier, tco,'to win the Progressive vote in this position, 
since the Progressive party was primarily interested in do-
mestic affairs, and action on this score could convince them. 
And Wilson did take advantage of this position. His "record 
for progressive legislation during that hot and hectic sum-
mer was as extraordinary as it was comprehensive. u51 In his 
speech of acceptance he could well say: "We have in four 
years come very near to carrying the platform of the Pro-
gressive party as well as our cwn; for we also are Progress-
ives. n52 Since the campaign did keep Wilson and his achieve-
ments before the public eye and especially the Progressive 
eye, it would seem well worthwhile to consider this legisla-
tion rather thoroughly. It falls into two main categories, 
farm and labor legislation. The Federal Farm Loan Act, 
though it really became law in May, is close enough to con-
vention time to warrant our study. It gains special import-
ance from the fact that the Republicans offered little to at-
tract the farmer vote in the coming election. Thousands of 
49 Quoted by Houston, QQ.,cit. I, 214. 
50 Baker, V, 263. 
51 Ibid., 263. 
52 Shaw, 308. 
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America.,,54 
The Federal Farm Loan Act was considered to be a 
gesture to the farmer: 
••• at the final passage in the House, 
the bill was reinforced by the vocal sup-
port of one of the survivors of Populism, 
Representative "CyclonE!' Davis, of Texas, 
whose political career was based on his 
unsurpaEsing skill in emitting a piercing 
Tebel yell'. His noisy thankgsiving in 
the House did not hurt the measure as a 
gesture to the farm opinion. 55 
In some quarters it was looked upon as a successful ending 
of a battle of 15 years, waged by grangers and some banks of 
the South and Middle West. 56 The poor financia~ status of 
the farmer was a grievance long before the Populists gave it 
voting strength. The People's Party which had asked for 
Federal storage facilities, easier credit and loans on farm 
crops, was now getting all of these provisions in the Farm 
Loan Act and they would not forget the President who put the 
through. Besides this Act there were the Cotton Futures Act 
and the Grain Standard Act to obtain fair prices, and the 
Permissive Warehouse Act which afforded storage facilities 
for the farmers. 
The Federal Farm Loan Act had provided for a Farm 
Loan Board, and Wilson's appointments to this board durjng 
54 Ibid. 
55 Paxson, 352. 
56 Lit. Dig., QQ.cit. 
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the campaign gave great publicity to his work for the farmer 
at an opportune time. Four members were appointed to journey 
from Maine to California "to determine the best means of 
putting all the advantages of the system at the disposal of 
the farmers.tI To this end a thorough study of farm condi-
tions and farm-loan means was to be made in each state, and 
witnesses at the hearing were to advise the board as to the 
needs of the farmers, the extent to which they expected to 
use the system, present difficulties in obtaining credit on 
farm mortgages and the cost of loans, including interest and 
commissions. These specifications are mentioned in detail 
because of the appeal they might have had to the farmer. 
Besides all these measures for the farmer, the 
previous years of Wilson's administration had seen many im-
provements which are recorded by the Secretary of Agricultur~ 
David Houston, in his book on the cabinet. Appropriations 
for the support of the regular activities of the Department 
of Agriculture had increased 50% from 24,100,000 to 
36,130,000 dollars;during the First Administration the De-
partment had created an Office of Information which simpli-
fied the farmer's bulletin, and facilitated circulation of 
farming news; it encouraged farm demonstration; it provided 
the Educational Extension Act, and an organization was cre-
ated to supervise inves,tigational work in rural finance and 
-89 
marketing. 57 If only half of these measures had pro-
duced favorable results we can imagine the effect upon the 
farmer. Naturally, we cannot measure accurately the effect 
upon the farmers' vote, but at least we can show that the 
Democrats appeared in the role of benefactors who offered 
them greater hope of prosperity and improvement. 
Farmers are acutely conscious of their economic 
interests; perhaps more than any other group in the popula-
tion they know where their economic interests lie. And 
they vote their economic interests. In the recent 1948 
election, President Truman, a farm boy himself, knew all 
thiS, and so was quick to point out that the falling wheat 
and livestock prices of the last few months were due to the 
influence of a probable Republican victory. The Republi-
can candidate, Thomas Dewey, did not convince the farmers 
that he would continue the price support program, and the 
Republican-minded farmers failed to support him just as the 
failed to support Hughes in 1916. In the 1916 election the 
farmers were enjoying a comparative prosperity since farm 
prices were high and the tendency in such circumstances is 
to leave well enough alone, as some Republican and Social-
ist papers pointed out afterwards. 58 The $2 wheat price 
57 Houston, I, 199-210. 
58 Literary Digest, November 14, 1916. 
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could well have been the deciding factor for the Republican 
northwest farmer, thus giving the margin of 200 votes in 
Minnesota, 3500 in Oregon, 2750 in South Dakota. Be that as 
it may, we want at least to realize that the Democrats made a 
concrete appeal to the farmer's vote. There seems to be a 
strong foundation for the observation of the Wall Street 
Journal that "apparently there was just one 'vote' reached by 
special appeal - the farmerst"58a With this quick look 
at Wilson Progressive legislation in general and its appeal 
to the farmer in particular, let us now turn to labor's part 
in the election. 
58a ~ Street Journal, November 11, 1916. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE LABOR VOTE AND THE CANDIDATES 
The labor vote was undoubtedly stirred by two bills 
that were pushed through Congress by President Wilson, but 
whether they had the effect of favoring the President is hard 
to determine. It seems that throughout the country the 
labor vote was rather evenly divided, but when narrowed down 
to the all-important state of California it could easily have 
been the deciding factor. At any rate, the Administration's 
labor policies did provide a vital issue in the campaign, and 
so are worthy of our consideration if only on that score. 
The acts that were to draw labor's attention were tJ:le Child 
Labor Act and the Adamson Act. 
The Child Labor Bill had originally appeared in the 
Progressive platform of 1912, and was only incorporated by 
the Democrats and the Republicans in 1916. While it was not 
opposed by the Republicans it was pleasing to the Progress-
ives and the circumstances surrounding the bill might have 
helped the President to a slight degree. The Democratic 
majority in the Senate had decided in caucus to exclude this 
bill from the list of measures to be enacted before adjourn-
ment, but on July 18 the President paid an unexpected visit to 
91 
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the Capitol to urge trJe Senate leaders to reconsider this de-
cision. l The bill had already passed the House by an over-
whelming majority, the Republican leaders in the Senate de-
sired favorable action, and only a small but determined 
minority of Southern senators opposed it. As a correspond-
ent of the Boston Transcript pointed out: 
••• for the first time, certainly in this 
administration, if not in many years, 
there is the spectacle of the President 
of the United States fighting the minority 
of his own party with the aid of leaders 
of the opposition. 2 
Whether the dominant motive of President Wilson in his dramat-
ic eleventh-hour demand for the passage of the child-labor 
law was politics or humanity - the newspapers naturally took 
both views - it was evident, at any rate, that the people 
wanted the measure and backed the President in his move. Only 
three states, the two Carolinas and Georgia, seriously op-
posed the bill which put an end to interstate commerce in 
goods made in mills which employed children under fourteen 
years of age, or in which children under sixteen years of age 
worked more than eight hours a day or were employed before 
seven o'clock in the morning or after seven o'clock in the 
evening. 
1 Ibid., July 29, 1916. 
2 Ibid. 
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The appeal of the bill to the Progressives was noted 
by the Yiashington correspondents, while its attractiveness to 
the hearts of women was noted by Mrs. O. H. P. Belmont with 
the exclamation: "Is this a Machiavellian stroke? Does our 
President at last see the wisdom of catering to those four 
million women voters out West?,,3 As one can guess, Mrs. 
Belmont was a suffragette referring to her militant sister-
suffragetters in the West. The Springfield Republican re-
marked that the Republican candidate's slurs upon Democratic 
progressiveness "would stand more chance of being believed" if 
the Democratic party had not put this piece of legislation on 
the statute books;4 and the Republican New York Tribune, a 
consistent critic of tbe administration, remarked: 
If President Wilson was seeking political 
credit when he insisted on the passage of 
this bill, he is entitled to it now ••• While 
he was merely taking up near its end tbe 
campaign carried on by reformers for years, 
he gave aid when it was much needed, and he 
took his stand regardless of offending 
wealthy Southerners whose political support 
he may need.5 
The circumstances surrounding the Adamson Act gave a 
great deal of publicity utilized by Wilson in the campaign. 
3 Ibid., 53:6, August 5, 1916. 
4 Ibid., 53:70, August 12, 1916. 
5 Ibid., 53:10, September 2, 1916. 
r 
94 
Headlines and front-page columns were given to Wilson and his 
work day after day so that his part in this labor drama kept 
him in the public eye. ,The Adamson Law, which established th 
basic eight-hour day, with time-and-a-half for overtime, came 
a bout mainly as tile result of a long, hard-fought campaign on 
the part offour powerful brotherhoods of railway employees en-
gaged in carrying freight between the states. The engineers, 
the firemen, the conductors and the trainmen made up the strong 
unions that had come to be known as the "big four tl • It was 
said that the agitation was not for a working day restricted 
to eight hours, for the laborers would agree that such a regu-
lation would hardly be feasible in the railroad buSiness, but 
for an eight-hour standard of pay. It was also said that the 
plan was first brought forward by sectional organizations of 
the brotherhoods as early as 1909, and, after gaining momentum 
over a period of seven years, it reached the railroad chiefs 
in March, 1916, backed by the united support of from 325,000 to 
400,000 men. 6 The owners of the railroads candidly added 
that the public would ultimately be made to bear the burden 
when and if the brotherhoods realized their objective. 
The American railroads had been controlled rather 
6 F. A. Ogg, National Progress, Harper & Brothers, New York, 
1918, 353. 
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effectively during the previous twelve years by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission which held them to the published tariffs, 
barred them from pooling and rebating, and kept them subject 
to administrative bodies whose tendency was to keep the rates 
down. ·Workmen's compensation and safety measures increased 
costs and operating expenses of the carriers, and while they 
sold their wares in a controlJed market they bought their labor 
in a competitive market. Interest on their bonds and divi-
dends to their stockholders were low while funds for improve-
ments were meagre. Such is the sympathetic picture painted by 
Paxson. 7 On the other hand there was "the prosperity en-
joyed by the railroads due to the heavy exports being made to 
Europe and to all the world since shortly after the war be-
gan."8 Doubtless this was one of the reasons for the rest-
iveness of the workers. 
In June, 1916, the railroad owners urged that the 
matt6r be brought before a tribunal of arbitration, but the 
labor heads would not cooperate. Throughout the summer every 
attempt at mediation. was blocked by the railroad brotherhoods, 
, 
and the prinCiple of an "eye form eye" was employed by labor, 
which in former times had pleaded in vain for arbitration. By 
August when it was clear to all concerned that the brotherhood 
7 Paxson, 354. 
8 Ogg, 355. 
had a death-grip on the nation's economy, the country became 
extremely anxious and the representatives of tr.e allied gov-
ernments of western Europe without a doubt shared this anxi-
ety. If the strike came there would be no relief ttrough in-
junctions of the Federal courts, as had been the case in the 
past; labor strikes had been exempted from this interference 
through the recent Clayton Anti-Trust Law. 
On August 16th President Wilson sent the following 
telegram to the Presidents of fourteen different railways: 
Discussion of the matter involved in 
the threatened railway strike has reached 
a point which makes it highly desirable 
that I should personally confer with you 
at the earliest moment and with the Presi-
dents of other railways affected who may 
be immediately accessible. Hope you can 
make it convenient to come to Washington 
at once.9 
When the brotherhood chairman and the railroad presidents ar-
rived at the White House, Wilson listened to the arguments on 
both sides, and then suggested that the railroads meet the re-
quest of the men for ten hours' pay for the first eight hours, 
and that the question of the rate for overtime be submitted to 
arbitration. As the railroad executives refused to yield on 
the eight-hour day unless it should be decreed by a tribunal 
of arbitration, on August 28th the representatives left Wash-
9 Baker and Dodd, V, 264. 
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ington with orders for a strike to begin at 7 A.M. on Septem-
ber 4th, which tlwould tie up every railroad from Maine to 
California and cause an insufferable paralysis of industry and 
trade."lO 
Wilson's name was now in the headlines daily for he 
seemed the only hope of preventing the strike. On August 
29th, he appeared before a joint session of Congress assembled 
in the Hall of the House of Representatives, and addressed the 
Legislature for approximately half an hour. Begging assist-
ance in dealing with a very grave situation, he proceeded to 
recommend the following legislation: (1) the enlargement of 
the administrati.ve organization of the Interstate Commission; 
(2) the establishment of the eight-hour day for all railway 
employees engaged in the work of operating trains in inter-
state transportation; (3) authorization of the appointment by 
the President of a small body of men to observe the actual re-
sults in experience of the adoption of the eight-hour day; 
(4) explicit approval by Congress of the consideration by the 
Interstate Commission of an increase of freight rates, should 
the facts justify the increase; (5) addition to the federal 
statute, which provides for arbitration in such controversies 
as the present, of a provision that in case the methods of 
10 Ogg, 356. 
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accommodation now provided should fail, a full public investi 
gation of the merits of every dispute shall be instituted and 
completed before a strike or lockout may be lawfully attemp-
ted; (6) and, finally, that the Executive should have the 
power, in case of military necessity; to take control of such 
portions of the railways as may be required and operate them 
for military purposes, with authority to draft into the mili-
tary service of the United States such train crews and ad-
ministrative officials as the circumstances might require for 
their sage and efficient use.Il 
When Wilson had sent the telegrams already men-
tioned to the various railroad presidents on August 16th, he 
had followed up with a statement for the public in which he 
said that only experience could determine just what arrange-
ments should be equitable for both the workers and the rail-
roads. But he pointed out that certain railroads which had 
already adopted the eight-hour day did not appear to be at 
any serious disadvantage "in respect to their cost of opera-
tion as compared with the railroads that have retained the 
t en-hour day. 1112 In the same statement Wilson claimed that 
the eight-hour day now "undoubtedly has the sanction of the 
judgment of society in its favor, and should be adopted." He 
11 Congressio!.l,§.l Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 53, 
13335-6. 
12 Baker and Dodd, V, 265. 
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had enlarged on this same idea in his message to Congress on 
August 29th: 
The whole spirit of the time and the 
preponderant evidence of recent economic 
evidence spoke for the eight-hour day. 
It has been adjudged by thought and ex-
perience of recent years a thing upon which 
society is justified in insisting on as 
in the interest of health, efficiency, 
contentment, and a general increase of 
economic vigor. The whole presumption 
of modern experience would, it seemed to 
me, be in its favor i whether there was arbitration or not. 3 
In that same address to Congress Wilson claimed 
that the railroad heads had rejected his plan because they wer 
convinced that they must "at any cost to themselves or to the 
country, stand firm for the principle of arbitration which the 
men had rejected."14 Wilson said that he also stood firmly 
in favor of the principle of arbitration in industrial dis-
putes, but that matters had come to a sudden crisis in this 
particular dispute, and the country had been caught unprovided 
with any practical means of enforcing the principal of arbi-
tration in practice. "I have based my counsel upon the in-
disputable fact that there was no means of obtaining arbitra-
tion."15 Wilson's intention was obviously to secure peace 
in the crisis by yielding to the demands of the railroad 
13 Congressional Record, ip.cit., 13336. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
brotherhoods, but also to put through such legislation as 
would make any such crisis impossible in the future. 
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Congress acted according to Wilson's desires but not 
completely, for although the Adamson Bill passed the House on 
August 31st and the Senate on September 1st, these two bodies 
cut away Wilson's proposals which looked to similar disputes i 
the future and also decided that the Bill would become effect-
ive on January 1st and not earlier. 16 
Taken by itself, the Adamson Act was controversial 
in character but since it was election time it became naturally 
enough, the subject of many debates. A few hostile periodi-
cals and newspapers will reveal the Republican attacks. "Con-
gress Stampeded" was the title of an article in Nation in 
which the writer concluded with a plea to "patriotic 1\.mericans" 
to decide for themselves whether or not the avoiding of the 
strike was worth "such a sacrifice of the nation's dignity".l? 
The same journal later chastised Wilson for rushing through 
"the judgment of society" in 48 hours, and then for being so 
bold as to defend the intrinsic merits of such lightning legis-
lation. In a constitutional government, the writer argued ••• 
16 Ibid., 13335-6, 133552. 
17 Nation, September 7, 1916. 
r 
••• there are certain recognized ways 
of seeing that the 'judgment of society' 
shall be embodied in laws. Boiled down 
to its essentials, [Wilson's] defense 
would justify passing in 48 hours anyth~ng 
that he thought [good for the nation.]l 
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A letter to the editor of Nation pointed out the incongruity 
of considering as the "judgment of society" a law whic.h. bene-
fited only the "comparatively few members of the four strongly 
organized unions." It went on to say that the situation 
would be fairly staggering were we candid enough to admit that 
20 percent of the employees of a great public service industry 
were dictating not only to the remaining 80 percent, but also 
to the holders of $20,000,000 worth of stocks and bonds. 19 
The New York Times ran a scathi~g editorial on Sep-
tember 2nd which included the following cry: 
The blackmailing of the whole nation under 
the threat of a strike and the extortion of 
a special act granting the demands of the 
brotherhood without time to inquire into the 
justice and practicability •.• put upon the 
country an intolerable humiliation. If such 
an outrage can be put upon us unresisted, we 
have lost our republican form of government.Below 
This theme of "national humiliation" was stressed by papers 
throughout the country especially ti1e Republican papers, a fact 
indicated in polls conducted by both the Literary Digest and 
Outlook. 20 
18 Nation, September 28, 1916. (Words in [ J are mine). 
19 New York Times, September 2, 1916. 
20 Literary Digest, 53: , September 6, 1916; Outlook CXIV, 
September 13, 1916. 
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The most prominent opponent of the Adamson Law, how-
ever, was Charles Evans Hughes. His attack upon the Law evoked 
the cry from the San Francisco Bulletin that instead of the 
many "manufactured campaign issues, we now have one that grew, 
like Topsy, and is real flesh and blood.,,21 Although a 
majority of the Republicans in Congress voted with the Demo-
crats in favor of the Adamson Law, Hughes nevertheless saw it 
as a tfblow at business in this country," and its enactment 
spelled lithe surrender of the very principle of government." 
It was, he claimed, Iflegislation without inquiry," and "the de-
mand by the Administration for such legislation as the price of 
peace was a humiliating spectacle.,,22 
In particular, however, Hughes urged three arguments 
against the Law. In the first place it merely raised wages, 
but did not reduce hours. Moreover, it should not have been 
passed without more time for investigation. Finally, Wilson 
knew for over a year that the crisis was coming, and should 
have been prepared for it. 23 To these arguments presented at 
a Republican rally in Springfield, Illinois, the Democrats were 
quick to answer. With regard to his charge that the bill was 
a wage bill and not an hours bill, they replied that it of-
21 Literary Digest, 53:12, September 16, 1916. 
22 Ibid., 53:15, October 7, 1916. 
23 New Republic, September 30, 1916. 
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fered the railroads the alternative of receiving 8 hours work 
for ten hours pay, or of doing 10 hours work in 8 hours. The 
railroads might save the extra pay by increasing the speed of 
certain freight trains. Furthermore, the law offered a 
tldirect economic incentive" to greater productivity, and though 
the incentive would have been strengthened by keeping the time-
and-a-half overtime which Wilson proposed, Congress would have 
been accused of increasing wages by 37 1/2% instead of 25%.24 
On Hughes' second point, namely, lack of time for 
sufficient investigation, the Democrats retorted that for over 
a year the "expertstt had been investigating, and that the whole 
process was becoming a grand tlguessing contest." A Board of 
Arbitration could only continue to guess. Hughes merely 
meant "guesswork before legislationn when he called for invest 
igation, while Woodrow Wilson and the Adamson Law stood for 
an "inductive experiment" on the basis of six months trial. 25 
With regard to Hughes' assertion that the President 
should have legislated to forestall the crisis, the Democrats 
admitted that while it would have looked better for Wilson, 
had the Adamson Law been enacted two or three months before 
showdown finally came, it was very doubtful in the minds of th 
Democrats that Wilson could have forced such a law through 
24 New Republic. 
25 Ibid. 
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Congress except under pressure, for the attitude of the Ameri-
can public would have been that of the man who said, "Who is 
he (Wilson) to meddle in this business and borrow trouble. tt26 
In his Labor Day speech Hughes had also directed 
some remarks to the principle of arbitration saying: "I be-
lieve and I stand here firmly for the principle of arbitrating 
all industrial disputes, and I would not surrender it to any-
body in the country. 11 He added: 
••• I stand for two things: first, for the 
principle of fair, thorough, candid arbitra-
tion; and second, for legislation of facts 
according to the necessities of the case; 
and I am opposed to qeing,dictated to 
either in the executive department or in 
Congress by any power on earth before the 
facts ~7e ~nown and in the absence of 
facts. 
That Wilson did not sacrifice this principle of arbitration 
was the opinion expressed in an article in Outlook; rather, 
Wilson "butted inn to rescue successfully the public from 
starvation. Our legislators, claimed the writer, were too 
sensible lito haggle with an earthquake. tl28 However, a better 
response was given by New Republic and Wilson's biographers 
when they blamed Congress for eliminating the recommendations 
made by Wilson for maintaining the principle of arbitration 
26 Ibid. 
27 New Yorlc Times" September 7, 1916. 
28 F. R. Serri, "Mr. Hughes and the Railroad Issue,tI; 
Outlook, October 11, 1916. 
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and for a better handling of future strikes. 29 Despite all 
the argumentation that filled papers and periodicals there 
was, it seemed to me, a great deal of truth in the remark of 
the New York Independent that 
••• attack and defense in this case did 
not meet head on since 'Mr. Hughes does not 
discuss the merits of the 8-hour day for 
railroad operatives and Mr. Wilsm does 
not discuss the propriety of enacting the 
-law with unusual rapidity because the 
workers threatened to strike if it did 
not become law by a given day.130 
At any rate all this publicity from the middle of August was 
not only keeping Wilson before the public eye but it pictured 
him as favorable to labor. 
But whether or not the Adamson Act influenced the 
vote, is more or less an open question even if the Progress-
ives were certainly attracted by this piece of legislation. 
In the all-important state of California, and especially in 
the city of San Francisco, organized labor was made even more 
conscious of the difference between the Progressive Wilson 
and the Conservative Hughes. The difference between the two 
men was accentuated by Wilson's action in the railroad and 
an incident that occurred at the time of Hughes' visit to San 
Francisco. On August 19th on the front page of the San 
29 New Republic, September 9, 1916; also Dodd, 164 and H. F. 
Bell, Woodrow Valson and the People, Doubleday Doran & Co., 
New York, 1945, 380. 
30 Literary Digest, 53:15, October 7, 1916. 
106 
Francisco Call these joint headlines were flaunted before the 
laborer's eyes: "Waiters Strike at Hughes Luncheon" and "Wil-
son Bids Railroad Chiefs Grant 8 Hours;1I and in the columns 
they read that the "Union lVien Refuse to Serve at Club - Cafes 
Send Open Shop Men to Wait on Hughest"31 While on the front 
page of the Bulletin they read: "Union Men Ask Hughes Not to 
Dine in Open Shop Club ,'82the Chronicle, a Republican paper, 
judiciously relegated the news of the waiters' strike to a 
small column on the second pag8. 33 
What was the incident that brought on these head-
lines? When the culinary workers in the city went on strike 
for the closed shop on August 1st they faced bitter opposition 
from organized employers. Hughes was to dine at a political 
party luncheon at the Commercial Club which, like most of the 
other prominent hotels, fought the unions and maintained an 
open shop. Hence, for Hughes' luncheon the Club was forced to 
hire scab-laborers and it was these men who served Hughes. 
"Whatever affront could be offered to organized labor by such 
an episode was offered"34 is the observation of one commenta-
tor. Wisely or not, Hughes made no mention of the strike at 
the luncheon, but the antithesis between his position and that 
of Wilson was definitely highlighted by the two incidents. 
31 San Francis~o Call, August 19, 1916. 
32 San Francisco Bulletin, August 17, 1916. 
33 San Francisco Chronicle, August 19, 20, 1916. 
34 Paxson, 378. 
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That labor realized this difference was made evident 
by a presidential "straw vote" of Union Labor conducted by the 
Literary Digest during October which sounded out "the con-
sensus of political opinion of union-labor officials repre-
senting more than 100 trades." The magazine claimed that 
"out of 457 labor officials, 332 said their members favor Mr. 
Wilson, 47 -,Mr. Benson, the Socialist Candidate, and 43 - Mr. 
Hughes •"35 0 t f course such a labor poll did no have the mean-
ing that it would have today, for in Wilson's time there did 
not exist the powerful unions of today which can so readily 
swing their solid vote behind one candidate. For example, 
in 1948 the labor unions in their desire to repeal the Taft-
Hartley Law and punish its Republican supporters backed Tru-
man for the Presidency and Democratic Congressmen with a cam-
paign expenditure of ~7,OOO,000. The labor unions in 1948 
were definitely united and could claim a major part in the 
victory of the Democratic President, but in 1916 there was 
not this union solidity. Nevertheless, the labor vote played 
an important part on the West Coast and in a few other 
isolated states as was conceded by many newspapers and com-
petent authorities. 
Some Republican politicians admitted th~t the labor 
vote was undoubtedly the means of carrying Ohio for V.ilson, an 
35 Literary Digest, 53:15, October 7, 1916. 
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it might have been the determining factor in California. 
~illiam G. Lee, President of the Brotherhood of Railroad 
Trainmen, is quoted in the LiT,erary Digest as saying that 
13,000 members of the railroad brotherhoods in California, 
2,500 in New York, 12,000 in Minnesota, 3,500 in New fuexico 
and 30,000 in Ohio were practically unanimous for vVilson.3 5,.."1. 
(It is well to note that most of these states had been re-
markably close in the election totals.) The Tribune also 
believed that these votes would not have been turned against 
Hughes if he simply had kept quiet about the Adamson Law. 
When he attacked it, the Brotherhoods made it their chief is-
sue and campaigned directly under the Democratic National Com-
mittee, emphasizing the fact that the President had cast his 
lot with them. 36 
Offsetting this attraction of organized labor to 
Wilson, was the antagonism of bankers, railroad magnates, and 
business owners who, in their financial, railway and conserva-
tive papers, denounced the President as a foe to arbitration 
in labor disputes. Because of his progressive legislation, 
the real opposition, as Dodd says, 
... 
the 
the 
and 
came from the industrial centers, from 
former bankers, railroad magnates, and 
sturdy old Republican stocks of the East, 
the middle ii~est, men who were afraid of 
35aIbid., 53:15, October 7, 1916. 
36 New Yor~ Tribune, November 14, 1916. 
even the moderate reforms of Southern-
ers and agrarians, from people who thought 
that the Government must ever reJlain sub-
servient to the industrial regions which 
had so long controlled the vital concerns 
of the nation. They feared Wilson. Nor 
did the larger labor organizations despite 
all that Wilson had done for labor, support 
the Democratic administration. Labor was 
more afraid of "empty dinner pails" which 
masters of industry threatened, than it was 
hopeful of good things to come from friends 
actually in power ••• 37 
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All that Doddclaims is apparently true, but in the vital west-
ern area, especially California,it could have been labor's 
vote that decided the contest in Wilson's favor. 
With this in mind it is interesting to note the 
opinions of a few representative newspapers on this matter of 
the influence of the labor vote upon the election's outcome, 
particularly in those influential states of the west and mid-
west. The Literary Digest published a symposium of the 
following significant papers on November 18th: the Cheyenne 
Tribune of Wyoming thought that the chief factor in Wilsen's 
victory was the large proportion of the railroad employees 
voting for him; the Ivdnneapolis Journal named among the de-
ciding factors the vote of the large labor centers and iron 
range employees who swung to Wilson for his 8-hour stand; 
the St. }'aul Pioneer Press thought that "the most reasonable 
explanation was the organized labor vOGe in the three large 
37 Dodd, 193. 
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cities of Minnesota, together with the general pacifist charac-
ter of the Swede population. In Ohio the Cleveland Plain 
Dealer attributed the second most influence to the industrial 
and prosperous elements who cried, ttLet well enough alone;tt 
in New Hampshire, the lone Wilson state in New England, the 
8-hour law was considered a major factor as it was also by the 
Republican Kansas Times of Leavenworth. 38 
We would expect the San Francisco papers to contain 
the most pertinent comments on the labor vote and yet they were 
preoccupied with the ;'rogress i ve-Conservative clash among the 
Republicans and carried little about the Labor vote. HO'it'lever, 
the Mercury-Herald of nearby San Jose thought that the "vic-
tory of Wilson in San Francisco was clearly due to the cohesive 
labor vote" which felt grateful to the President for jamming 
through Congress the Adamson 8-hour law. 39 Moreover, the San 
Francisco Chronicle ran an article written by Chester Rowell, 
Chairman of the Republican State Central Committee in which he 
asserted that the labor vote, added to the minority of 
Progressives and the pacifist's woman's vote, turned the tide 
for Wilson. 40 Across the country in New York the Tribune 
pointed but that in San Francisco, lithe heart of California and 
38 Literary Di~est, 53:21, November 18, 1916; also Outlook, 
November 28, 1916. 
39 San Jose Mercury-Herald, November 19, 191~. 
40 San Francisco Chronicle, November 11, 1916. 
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perhaps the strongest labor union city in the country," 
Wilson won nine out of the 13 assembly districts. ~ignifi-
cantly, the paper pointed to the flluncheon mistake" of 
Hughes, "his failure to recognize Hiram Johnson", and the 
"criticism of his opponent. u4l 
In Los Angeles, where Hughes tied in with Harrison 
OtiS, the arch-enemy of union labor in the state, the Express 
gave first and second place respectively to the progressive 
polictes of the Democrats and the labor vote. 42 Naturally, 
other newspapers thought other factors more important. It is 
our purpose, however, to show which were the chief sources of 
the deciding votes. So much, then, for the labor legisla-
tion and its part in influencing the American people and in 
building up the appeal to the Progressives. 
41 New York Tribune, November 13, 1916. 
42 Los Angeles Express, November 10, 1916. 
CHAPTER VII 
TEE RESPONSE OF THE PROGRESSIVES 
But how were the Progressives taking to the two 
candidates through the campaigning? The newspapers naturall 
talked up both men. Speaking at Plattsburg on September 
12th, the day after the supposedly significant Republican 
clean sweep of the primaries in Maine, Hughes expressed his 
feelings (or hopes?), "I come to you as the spokesman of a 
reunited party."l But reunion in fact was far less than 
in hope for it was becoming evident that not even Roosevelt, 
the former idol of the Progressives, could deliver the whole 
Progressive vote to the Republicans. 
The Progressive votes were definitely split if one 
could judge from the positions taken by the prominent men in 
the party. Francis Heney, fiery prosecutor and violent 
'bull-mooser', ran as a Democratic elector in California and 
led his ticket. While Albert Beveridge, as we have seen al-
ready, stumped for Hughes, Victory Murdock, editor of the 
Whicita Daily Eagle, and chairman of the defunct Progressive 
National Committee supported Wilson. His close associates, 
Gifford Pinchot and James R. Garfield, followed Roosevelt 
1 Paxson, 359-360. 
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into the Republican line, but each had a distinguished 
brother who came out for Wilson. The scientists, John 
Burroughs and Luther Burbank, lent their name to the Demo-
crats, as did Thomas A. Edison and Henry Ford. 2 "John M. 
Parker, the Progressive Vice-Presidential candidate, bitter-
ly attacked Roosevelt for returning to a Republican party 
more reactionary than ever before."3 Bainbridge Colby 
also came out for Wilson as did Samuel Gompers who joined 
wi th the Vice "resident and Secretary of the American Federa-
tion of Labor in a statement which strongly recommended the 
Democrats. 4 Evidently the "feast of unity" held by Hughes 
and Roosevelt in New York on October 35 was not as success-
ful as they had hoped it to be and Wilson's praise of the 
Progressives in a speech of September 30th seemed to have 
fallen upon sympathetic ears among the Drogressives. 
To remove any doubt as to the attractiveness of 
Wilson's record of legislation to the Progressives, the New 
York Times tells us that just a few days before the election, 
eleven of the nineteen members of the defunct platform com-
mittee of the Progressive party convention of 1912 endorsed 
2 Ibid., 360. 
3 Baker, 287. 
4 New York Times, October 22, 1916. 
5 Ibid., October 4, 1916. 
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Wilson and called upon all members of the party to support 
him. They declared: 
Of thirty-three planks in the Progress-
ive platform of 1912, twenty-two have 
been wholly or partly enacted into laws. 
Of eighty propositions embodied in these 
planks, more than half have been cagried 
out by administrative acts or laws. 
However, the really important defection of the 
Progressives was in the West and especially in the state of 
California. Colonel House, realizing the effects of Hughes' 
campaigning in the West remarked sarcastically: "I ex-
pressed regret that the Democratic Committee's finances were 
in such condition that they could not offer to pay for ••• 
for instance, the Golden Special." This was the name of 
the train that the Republicans sent West with Hughes aboard 
and House thought his trip worthy of Democratic pay.7 But 
Tumulty had made similar observations even before the actual 
trip to the VJ est. In a letter to Mr. Raymond T. Baker on 
August 4th he had remarked: 
My belief is that Hughes' trip to the 
West will prove another distinct disap-
pointment to his friends. A candidate 
following the path of expediency as exem-
plified by Hughes will find himself in an 
unenviable position in the West, merely 
6 Ibid. November 1, 1916. 
7 Seymour, 371. 
criticizing, finding fault, and setting 
forth no policy of a constructive 
character.(j 
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This prediction was remarkably accurate, and in it Tumulty 
stressed an essential weak point in Hughes' campaign, name-
ly that he had to attack achievements and not principles of 
doubtful value. 
Two things stand out in Hughes' western campaign, 
the critical tenor of his speeches and his failure to ac-
knowledge Johnson and the Progressives. The critical rather 
than constructive character of his speeches, noted by the 
newspapers and prominent men centered mostly upon the ad-
ministration's disregard of the merit system, failure to 
maintain the constitutional rights of American citizens in 
Mexico, and general inefficiency.9 A quotation by the Call 
Bulletin of San Francisco was very expressive of the Pro-
gressive sentiment toward Hughes' speeches: "We have waited 
in vain for Mr. Hughes to say something that would show his 
reputed Progressivism. ,,10 
The second' factor, one which gained a great deal of 
unwanted publicity for the Republicans and for Hughes, was th 
so-called tlsnubbing" of Governor Johnson. It was picked up 
8 Tumulty, 195-
9 San Francisco Call-Bulletin, August 15-25, 1916. 
10 Literary Digest, 53:10, September 9, 1916. 
, 
116 
immediately by the newspapers and most books on this period 
regard the episode as one of the major reasons for the Demo-
cratic majority in California. Briefly the story was as 
follows. In 1908 California had gone Republican 2 to 1 and 
in 1912 the state had given its electoral votes to the Pro-
gressives. Roosevelt was the Progressive candidate for the 
Presidency that year and his running mate for the vice-
presidency was Hiram Johnson, the Governor 01" California. 
Johnson nevertheless had remained in control of the Republi-
can party's State Committee despite the fact that he had 
turned Progressive. In 1914, though the ,Conservative Re-
publicans regained control of the State Central Committee 
Johnson was then elected Governor on the Progressive ticket. 
Rence when delegates were selected for the Chicago convention 
of the Republicans, tIle Conservatives, angry at Johnson for 
his Progressive affiliation, refused to join the two parties' 
delegates and sent conservative Republicans to represent the 
party. 
When Hughes arrived in California Johnson was out 
dutifully canvassing for Hughes, and himself as Progressive 
and Republican candidate for the United States Senate, a 
situation possible under California laws. The Conservative 
Republicans had no desire to see Johnson elected and so they 
ignored him. At the largest of the party rallies in San 
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Francisco on August 18th, despite the fact that the Pro-
gressives demanded that Johnson be acclaimed, Johnson was not 
even in attendance, the Conservative RepUblicans simply re-
fusing to recognize him. Throughout the campaign, though 
there was one occasion when they were in the same hotel, 
Hughes never spoke to Johnson. Paxson notes 
••• that it helped JOAoson in his person-
al campaign that the stalward Republican 
committee were so openly his enemies but 
it did not help Hughes that the most in-
fluential political personage in the State 
should be affronted.~l 
Johnson never referred to the incident, nor did he waver in 
his loyalty to Hughes, but his followers did, and "the coun-
try knew that the Central Committee had endangered the elec-
tion of Hughes because of its animosity to Johnson. tl12 Out-
look predicted that Hughes' tfunbenevolent neutrality" would 
make the voting close in California. 13 Naturally, the 
Democratic papers played up this chance to widen the breach 
between the Republicans and the Progressives. Even the in-
dependent Call-Bulletin printed on the front page: If Hughes 
Blunders Here Lost Him 100,000 Votes Say the Progressives," 
and added "Hughes seen in company of men whose very names 
11 Paxson, 356, 357. 
12 Ibid., 356, 357. 
13 Outlook, October 25, 1916. 
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have always spelled reaction and anti-progressivism through-
out the state."14 Two days before in an editorial jt had 
spoken of Johnson's absence from the flregular" function at 
which Mr. Hughes was entertained in San Francisco. The 
Democratic San Francisco Post had likewise stressed nughes' 
departure from the state without having once met Governor 
Johnson. 15 The silence of the Republican Chronicle is 
again significant. 
The voting in California seemed to confirm the 
predictions of Progressives and the Democratic newspapers 
that California would be lost to the Republicans. Of the 
531 electoral votes, 266 were necessary for a victory. With-
out California, Hughes had 254 and Wilson had 264. The 
thirteen votes of California loomed high in importance dtITing 
those last few hours of vote counting. To accentuate the 
sDspense, Governor Johnson had already been elected by a huge 
majority of 296,815 votes, indicating what might have been 
accomplished for Hughes if he and bis managers had bestowed a 
gracious smile upon the right people. As it turned out, 
Wilson took CaliforLia's electoral votes by the slight margin 
14 San Francisco Bulletin, August 23,1916. 
15 San Francisco Call, August 21, 1916. 
of 3773 popular votes. Mark Sullivan remarked, "however 
much it (the outcome) was due to the action of Johnson's 
followers whom Johnson could not control, the incident, 
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normally a local teapot tempest, achieves high importance 
when we realize how different history would have been. Hl6 
Naturally the Progressives claimed credit for the 
election results, but the newspapers, even the Republican 
ones, likewise attriouted great importance to the Progressive 
vote. The San Francisco Hulletin claimed that the "defec-
tion from Mr. Hughes began when he came to the State and 
affiliated with the anti-Johnson Republicans" and that many 
Johnson Progressives turned to Wilson because of his pro-
g.ressi vism. ,,17 The San Francisco Examiner summed up its 
opinion in the editorial title tlProgressive vote defeats 
Hughes H18 and the Call & Post in an article with the cap-
tion, ttHughes lost by party politics. n19 The Los Angeles 
Express among many causes included the progressive policies 
of Wilson and the fact that "Hughes had been used by a small 
group of' California reactionaries. H20 The Los Angeles 
- ,-16 Sullivan, Our Times, V, 243. 
17 San Francisco Bulletin, ~ovember 10, 1916. 
18 San Francisc9 Examiner, November 11, 1916. 
19 San Francisco Call ~ ~, November 11, 1916. 
20 ~ Angeles Express, November 11, 1916. 
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Times, a Republican paper hostile to Johnson, bitterly cried 
that ttthere was undoubtedly a treasonable combine in northern 
California between Johnson and Wilson supporters. tl It even 
blazed headlines lii<e the following: "Johnson is blamed for 
treachery," "How Johnson's perfidy beat Hughes," and ttHughes 
secretly traded off for Johnson • .,21 These were exaggera-
tions because Johnson, regardless of his followers, still 
canvassed for Hughes despite the affront given him. He an-
swered the attack of the Los Angeles Times in an article that 
was run on the front page of the San Francisco Call and Post 
in which he blamed the Conservative Republicans for the loss 
since they had issued an "ultimatum" that Itr. Hughes would 
have nothing to do with the Progressives in California.,,22 
The Spokane Spokesman-Review conceded prime importance to the 
I fact "that Washington is Progressive, and the refusal of the 
Republicans to recognize Progressives resulted in resentment 
that swept many into the Democratic ranks.,,23 
In the East, too, on November 12th the New York 
Times claimed that the nVote of Women and Bull Moose Elected 
Wilson. 1124 , while the Independent (harper's Weekly) in its 
analysis included these two elements among four: 
• • • the conviction on the part of the 
western progressives, who are more radical 
~~-~-~-21 12! Angeles Times, November 10, 11, 1916. 
2? 2!ll Francisco Call and ~, November 11, 1916. 
2) Spokane Spokesman-Review, November 11, 1916. 
24 ~ York Times, November 12, 1916. 
and warmhearted than their eastern 
brothers, that liiir. Wilson was more their 
kind of a Progressive than Mr. Hughes 
and their belief that the Democratic party 
under the leadership of Mr. Wilson is the 
present party of progress, while the Re-
publican party under the present leader-
ship is the party of the backward look; 
••• the willingness of the Republican candi-
date to content himself with an attack upon 
Mr. Wilson and his deeds, and the failure 
of the Republican campaign to develop any 
kind o~ positive appeal to the progressive 
vote. 2..J 
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The New York American, usually critical of Wilson's policies, 
admitted that the Progressives were probably satisfied with 
Wilson's progressive legislation;26 while the Boston Globe 
considered Uthe verdict a victory for Democratic and:1> ro-
gressive ideas."27 The Fhiladelphia Ledger thought that 
the Progressive vote in a sense is the whole reason why Re-
publicans failed "because it explains the enormous defection 
of Republicans in California. tt28 While the Chicago Herald 
chimed in that Hughes was beaten because the people of Cal-
ifornia and other states of the West believed him, unjustly, 
to be a puppet of the Old Guard.,,29 
Progressives also confirmed the opinions of the 
press. John M. Parker, former i'rogressi ve candidate for the 
25 Independent, 88:3546, November 20, 1916. 
26 ~ York American, November II, 1916. 
27 Boston Globe, November 10, 1910. 
28 Philadelphia Ledger, November 20~ 1916. 
29 Chicago Herald, November 13, 1910. 
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Vice-Presidency, thought that the human-welfare and pro-
gressive legislation of Wilson, more than had been enacted 
in the preceding fifty years, was undoubtedly of the great-
est appeal to the Progressives.30 Bainbridge Colby was of 
the opinion that the Progressives cost Hughes the vote in 
California, and, he estimated that from 60 to 70 percent of 
the Progressives voted for Wilson,3l while Matthew Hale, a 
Massachusetts Progressive considered Wilson to be the fore-
most Progressive in the country.32 Chester H. Rowell, 
former Progressive and chairman of the Republican State 
Central Committee of California opined that 
••• Charles Hughes was defeated because 
his western trip did not convince the 
rank and file of Western Progressives 
that his election would mean a sufficient 
recognition of the Progressive movement
33 and influence in a newer Republicanism. 
The Democratic National Comm~eemen from California also 
admitted that without the help of the Progressives and 
dependents they could not have carried California. 34 
Among historians there are two who comment 
directly upon this point. James Truslow Adams 
30 San Francisco Bulletin, November 11, 1916. 
31 Ibid. 
32 ~ ~ American, November 11, 1916. 
33 SaD Francisco Bulletin, November 10, 1916. 
34 Literary Digest, 15:22, November 10, 1916. 
thought 
in-
it 
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probable that "the apparent lack of interest shown by Hughes 
in progressive policies at home, as well as his somewhat 
evasive speeches on all topics, had gained as many votes as 
the slogan ••• "35 Dwight Dumond is of the opinion tnat "the 
presidential election did not hinge on the war issue l1 but 
rather claimed that "the Republican candidate ••• was defeated 
because neither he nor his party would endorse or offer a sub-
stitute for the social and economic reform program. tt36 
In his autobiography William Allen White wrote: 
tI ••• the returns ••• proved clearly that Wilson was elected by 
the votes of the Progressive states normally Republican in the 
Middle West, many of them for Roosevelt in 1912 ••• " To prove 
that "Hughes was not sufficiently aware of the Progressive 
issues to appeal to these Republican states,tt he recalled a 
conversation with Hughes during the heat of the campaign when 
Hughes asked him: ttWhat are the Progressive issues?" Hughes 
then listened to White's summary of them with sympathetic 
intelligence, but White was of the opinion that Hughes did 
not comprehend how earnestly a considerable section of public 
opinion had accepted and endorsed these issues. White then 
added that the people of Kansas and the other western states 
35 Adams, History of the U.S., 209. 
36 Dwight Dumond, Roosevelt to Roosevelt, Henry Holt & Co., 
New York, 1937, 213. 
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who voted a Republican state ticket and then voted for Wilson 
did so "because of his progressive achievements in his first 
term. ,,37 
It seems that whether the Progressive issue eclipsed 
the war issue or not, we can at least draw from the above sum-
mary of Wilsonts legislation and its appeal to the Progress-
ives the conclusion that the Progressive vote did have an im-
portant effect upon the results of the election that saw Wil-
son carry the West, put Ohio in the Democratic column, and 
take the close races in New Mexico, Minnesota and New Hamp-
shire. 
Just as the platitudes of Thomas E. Dewey failed to 
carry the American voters with him in 1948, so too, in 1916 
the pIa ti tudinous speeches of Nr-. Hughes brought him short of 
victory. As the New York Times editorial said: 
Wilson appealed to the country upon his 
record of public achievement ••• No issue 
was settled, because no issue was raised 
by Mr. Hughes. From his own utterances 
the country reached the conclusion, it 
could reach no other, that in Mr. Wilsonts 
place, he would have adopted Mr. Wilsonts 
policies, that if elected he would continue 
Mr. Wilson's policies. The electorate chose 
Mr. Wilson because it knew him better, 
understood him better, because it was averse 
to a change.38 
37 White, Autobiography, 350-352. 
38 New York Times, November 10, 1916. 
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It was thus that Hughes, making no appeal to the Progressives, 
found himself weaker in November than he had been in June. 
People forgot that his governorship had been a constructive, 
progressive administration. 
co~rCLLTSIOE 
Thus it was that the election of 1916, so important 
because of the critical state of tl}e world 2n('1 .Anerica' s 
growinr prominence in world affairs, seemed to hi~-e upon the 
two imnortant issues of Wilson's neutrality and proEressivism, 
made real to the people? of the nation by a simTJle slo"'an and a 
series of legislc,tion. The :;"ormer \:Jon the ~JOmen and the 
pacifists, the latter, a section of the Proprcssives suffi-
cient to TJrovide a sli~ht najority • 
.At first 1;Te ToJOnder 1,'lhy the election ';Jas so close. 
However, althourh the bettin~ was ten to seven in favor of 
Hughes, the Republican candidate h2d an extremely difficult 
task, some 1..rhat comperable to role of President Truman in 
19)+9 uhen he battled to P2,SS legislation afainst the 'om·rerful 
combination of the Re~ublicans an~ the southern minority of 
his ovm De;n.ocratic party. From convention to election Hughes 
had to steer his campai~n ship throu-h a political Scylla and 
Charybdis ';Ji th Hoosevel t cmd his bitterly c.nti-German follow-
ers on one sioe, and on tho. other, the influential German-
American politicians, ne~JSnaDer~en and voters. Beyond this 
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danger lay another obstacle in the radical element of the 
former Pro~ressives, whose loyalty had to be held without 
alienatinr the Conservative ~ajority of the Republican ranks. 
It is not stran[e, then, that just as Dewey stressed 
Il na tior:al unityll Ht'..01es eJ~1:OQ2sized tlnational efficiency!! 
in a campaign that was a masterni~ce of st~addling but un-
fortunately and conse(luently filled ui th ':Teal,: appeals upon 
the vital issues before the pu>lic. 
To balance thcse disadvanta~es there were other 
factors decidedly in Hughes f favor. AltQouch Hughes "l'las a 
conservative as the outmoded Dublic beord that adorned his 
f2ce, stil"! this conse::::,va·!~isr:.1 ',JaS an asset r8.tLler than a 
handicop if one considered the e13ction trend before 1916. 
The cup of progress WBS filling up toward the end of the 
Wilsonian administrction and a reaction toward conservatism 
loomed up in the crystal ball, s8emin~ly indicated by the 
results of the Naine Glections. In 1900 the Conservative 
IvJ:cKinley hRo dS.'cated a ProrTessive Bryan. Then the see-8m.". 
tilted 2.:nd the Pror:re ssi ve Roo.s evel t ros e in victory v!hile 
the Conservative Parker i.vent dovm to defeat. Conservatism 
returned. ~ith TEft in 1908 only to yield to the Progressive 
Wilson in 1912. ~his see-saw reaction indicated a trend that 
1 " . .C> t·' tl " t· , ~ C -I- • IVOU C, l.l con lnUeG, mean ano 1e:..' -rJ.umpn lor onserva Glsm. 
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This seems to be one of the basic reasons for the remarkably 
close vote. 
There was likel"!ise the other side of the 'Vlar issue 
that t'las constantly brouGht home to the !)opu18T mtnd by the 
Hearst papers throughout the country, namely the inefficiency 
of l/lilson in foreign affairs, particularly in H:exico where his 
misguided policy had prolonged the revolution and gained 
nothing for the United. states but enmity and distrust. Un-
doubtedly, these newspaper attacks added numbers to the ranks 
of the conservative businessmen '\1]110, despite the Democratic 
slogan of "He Kept Us Out Of Vlar fl VIi th its passionate support 
by vast sections of the country, believed that "Wilson's 
policy I,vas bI'inging the country rapidly nearer the brink and 
that a prudent states;nan like Hughes had the best chance to 
extricate the country from its si tuat:i_on. ,,1 
These t1:!O factors vlere undoubtedly of great in-
flnence in the conservative east and are perhaps the best 
ex~)lanation \'Jhy, 1'111en this section s'imng so heavily to Hughes, 
the ne'VTspapers of New York "'Ti th but tvlO exceptions took for 
granted that the trend to conservatism viaS nation-':lide and 
1 J.C.Long,Liberal PreSidents, Thomas Y. Rom1trell Company, Hew 
York, 19lt8, 133. 
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the faith in Hughes' diplomacy greater than that in 1.lJilson. 
Thus the ITew York l'Jorld, the Sun and the Herald either 
aru~ounced Hughes' victory on election night or predicted it 
as certain. While the Times prude:ltly 13ithheld jUflgment, the 
New York American in spite of the mounting opinton of the 
opposi tion predicted a 1,V1lson victory. 2 Only the American 
foresai'J a Democratic storming of the lvest vlher!:.':) they took 
not only the Democratic states but even such dependable 
Republican centers as Utah and Kansas. Every state west of 
the l.fississippi l'lent to ~\lilson except for Hinnesota, Iowa, 
South Dakota, E.nd Oregon and these Ivere lost only by slight 
margins. ',vorthy of note is the fact that although close to 
a million votes had been cast for the Socialist candidates 
in 1912, the number significantly dropped to about five 
hundred thousand and it is hard to imagine thsse liberal 
votes going for the representative of the Conservative 
Republicans. 
Wilson's victory, which made him the first President 
to be elected without the votes either of New York or 
Pennsylvania vrhose electoral votes were about one-third of 
the total two hundred and sixty-six, Iva s based on a new 
2 Nev; York American, November 9, 1916; this issue contained 
a cOI"Jparative study of all the headlines of the 11e1'1 York 
papers. 
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alignment of the l'lest and the South. It 'vas the importance 
of the votes in the Hest, therefore, that ~llarks this election 
as exceptional since a solid Democratic south '..ras hardly a 
novelty in A.merican ~olitics. Consequently, studyin,c: the 
issues vlit~l this in mind, has shot .. m ho\'1, if politics is a 
play upon public opinion, the Democrats were a bit more suc-
cessful in gaugin", the public opinion of the T,'Iest than i.1ere 
the Republicans. The vIaI' issue with its slogan of "He Kept 
Us Out Of War" vIas more in accord '.vi th the pacifist senti-
ments of a 'I.t'!estern area that vlaS far removed from the sub-
marine I'Tarfare of tae east coast. The prosperity in agri-
cultural circles and ti.1e ac1mo',dedged attempts of '.:lilson and 
the Democrats, esp':;cially during the cai;1paign, to improve the 
lot of the farmers seemed to impress these politically sensi-
tive citizens. ",lilson's sympathetic attitude to\,vard the 
laboring man displayed in his stand for the Adanson Lct was 
helpful, if only on the west coast and in the city of San 
Francisco, especially when contrasted "';lith the opinions of 
Hughes and the Repu>licans and the poor tactics curing the 
campaign tour in that section of the country. Finally, in the 
all-important state of California, "'There the deciding votes 
Ivere cast, the split beb-Jeen the Progressives and the 
Republicans and the subsequent inability of Hughes and the 
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Republican committee to siding the Progressive votes back into 
the Republican column, permi -:ted i:lilson' s progressivism to 
be regarded as a satisfying alternative for those Progressives 
who had bolted from the Republican party. 
Our study of the issues has hardly been definitive 
upon the subject for as someone remarked, " we hold an election 
and then spend a lifetime decidin~' the v'Tinning issues." The 
deciding influence is too frequently Ul1.fathoma1:1e and even 
vii th the comments of newspapers and magazines the result is 
only an approximation '\:Jithou' certitude. HOI,rever, these same 
sources have helped us to understand just what ivere the 
issues, and they have indicated, even thouph in an imperfect 
fashion, the proportionate importance to ';e attached to the 
numerous issues. A study of the candidates' speeches before 
the election and a review of the neivspapers after".·mrds in-
dicated ho1,'! issues such as the I-loman's vote and the hyphenate 
vote, though highly rated durin;:: the cal:~paign, actually came 
to deserve the characterizatj_on of artificial. The ivestern 
papers 1'lere stressed bec2,~~se of the obviously 1mportant part 
played by the 'Itlestern states, especially California. vie 
sincerely hope that our understanding of the deciding issues 
has been enlarged and that some light has been added by this 
survey of the issues in this all-important election of 1916. 
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If there is one lesson that this election teaches, it is 
the importance of the individual vote, for the closeness of 
the final count in many states indicates the duty and 
responsibility of each voter in the country. The ~an elected 
President vlaS to shape A.merica' s destiny for a good many 
years. 
The victory '/las undoubtedly satisfying to the ex-
college p:i:"'ofessor if only because of the personal motive that 
must have been aroused by the rather bitter criticism that 
attended his second marriage to Mrs. Edith Bolling Galt 
'vi thin fourteen months after the death of his first \vife. The 
confidence of the women voters seemed to prove how baseless 
and malicious "Tere the calumnies by -,'Thich this President 
had been attacked. Then, too, Hilson \-{as to be given a chance 
to test his idealistic principles and his ~_elief in the 
moral leadership of America and a lIpeace vJi thout victory." 
Europe rejected both of these principles but he was to be more 
:i tterly disappointed I'Then his ovm country I'lould rej ect his 
plan for an international organization, the necessity for 
"Thich he envisioned before the \-JOrld of his time 'IIJaS ready to 
accept it. H01.'Jever, not only America but the 'It{hole ".vorld \-JaS 
to ack.nmvledge the need for today's version of the League of 
Nations. 
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